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Peace Atlas of Europe

Peace Atlas of Europe

SAMUEL VAN VALKENBURG

● ONCE more the map of Europe will be redrawn and, once more, we may be sure that heated controversies will accompany the drafting of new political boundaries. The disputes between the former Polish Government in London and the Soviet Union over the Curzon Line, between Poland and Czechoslovakia over Teschen, and between Yugoslavia and Italy over Trieste have given us an indication of what the problems may be. They are unpleasant but not insoluble, provided there is enough mutual good will and readiness to compromise. Even so, no solution is likely to be perfect or complete, for people move back and forth across frontiers, governments change, and life in general is in a constant state of flux.

If it could be assumed, for example, that a Fed-

eration of Europe would issue from the Second World War, it would then be safe to minimize the importance of boundary problems. But there are no present indications that such a Federation is imminent. The principle of national sovereignty is still operative and political as well as racial nationalism remain powerful forces in contemporary life. The drawing of boundaries continues, therefore, to be a matter of vital concern to every nation involved.

What boundary will give it the greatest amount of security in the present world situation?

What economic needs should be satisfied?

What peoples of racial kinship should be brought into the state?

What disposition should be made of racial minorities?

These are the questions which are being raised and for which some kind of satisfactory answers will need to be supplied.

The prevailing political atmosphere profoundly influences the answers which the most interested parties are suggesting. After two disastrous wars, there is a disposition to believe that, in justice, Germany must pay dearly for the damage done to

its ravaged neighbors. And because the Nazis succeeded in organizing the German minorities beyond Germany's borders to assist in aggression, there is also a disposition to believe that these German minorities must be moved from the reconstituted states of central and western Europe. In varying degrees these same feelings apply to Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italy, so that the belief is widespread that, once boundaries are drawn again, minorities must be exchanged in the interest of national security. Then, too, there is the important factor of the interplay of the interests of the Great Powers, which inevitably bears upon the settlements affecting the smaller states. These factors are all present to influence the definition of boundaries and, in turn, to help determine the activities and evolution of the United Nations organization.

The text which follows attempts to keep these things in mind without undertaking to pass moral judgment upon them. In the nature of things, it cannot be a complete study of all the problems which are likely to arise. A selection is made only of those which appear to be the most important; and in each case an effort is made to show how the problem has developed historically

PEACE ATLAS OF EUROPE

to its present state. In a few instances there are suggestions as to how problems might be met, but in most cases only the essential facts are presented. General understanding of these facts is necessary if the issues raised by Europe's boundary controversies are to be handled intelligently in the interest of the future peace.

With regard to the "facts," it must always be borne in mind that statistics, while helpful, are not the last word. They tend to favor the point of view of the nation which provides them and it seldom happens that rivals agree on these matters. It is all too easy to group figures to prove your argument. Personal, intimate knowledge of the problem areas is consequently necessary and, in most cases, more important than the figures which may be secured from the parties in dispute.

The Main Boundary Problems

The main problems dealt with here fall into four major groups, according to their location and historical background.


1. THE WESTERN GROUP. The problems of this group had their origins long ago. In fact it was the partition of Charlemagne's Empire (Treaty of Verdun, 843) which brought into existence a zone of transition between the French and German-Italian spheres of influence. The zone of transition sometimes stood by itself but more often was encroached upon by either side according to political-military strength. Sometimes the Holy Roman Empire dominated, sometimes France. Its inheritance is still recognizable in the independence of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland and in the problems of

THE MAIN BOUNDARY PROBLEMS

Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War. The collapse had its afterpains, particularly because of the difficulty of drawing ethnographic lines.

4. THE BALKAN GROUP. This group is very much like the third group but here it is the breakdown of the Turkish rule which is still causing political instability.

Only two problems fall outside these four groups, namely, the one of Ireland and that of Schleswig. Both are the result of gradual penetration of a major unit into the territory of a minor one.



1. The Netherlands and Germany

● THE long, rather irregular Dutch-German frontier is one of long standing. In the sixteenth century, when the Lowland countries separated themselves from the German Reich, it was superimposed on a flat landscape with the same kind of people on either side. With the passing of time, it matured into one of the most definite lines of separation on the European continent. The Dutch Republic, later the Kingdom of the Netherlands, went one way, the German states to the east another, and now the boundary separates two different ethnographic units.


The boundary south of the Rhine is of later date. Originally the Dutch Republic possessed three separate units along the Meuse (Maas) River for strategic purposes, including Venlo and Maastricht. At the Congress of Vienna the new



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boundary of the United Lowland countries connected those together with the surrounding areas as the province of Limburg. It is interesting to note how the boundary follows the Meuse (Maas) River only a few miles to the east. At that time the Great Powers did not want Prussia to get access to the Meuse. When Belgium and the Netherlands were separated (1839), the eastern part of Limburg remained with the latter country, extending southward as a salient. Nominally it was a duchy, part of the German "Bund," but in reality it was a part of the Netherlands and the last ties with Germany were broken in 1866. Since then the boundary has become very effective. Liberated Netherlands, badly damaged by floods brought about by the Nazis, may ask for German territory in compensation—possibly the areas historically closest to her, East Friesland, Cleve, and Upper Geldern.

The boundary proposed, shown on the map, was published by a Dutch periodical issued in the United States and has no official basis. It would give the Netherlands the naval base of Wilhelms-haven as well as a large part of Westphalia, including the city of Muenster.



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2. The Ruhr District

● ALTHOUGH war has destroyed most of the surface features of the colossal industrial development of the so-called Ruhr District, the factors which caused that development are still in existence and there is no reason to believe that industries will not rise again. The United Nations may want to control that construction and it seems worthwhile to consider the case.

The map indicates that the name "Ruhr District" is not correct. Even if the separate developments of the area of Aachen, that along the Roer and the Cologne district are not taken as part of the major development, the Ruhr itself covers only a small part and the name "Rhenish-Westphalian" industrial area is more appropriate.

The factors which favor the rebirth of manufacturing can be divided into three groups—

power, location and transportation, and population.

Power. The Ruhr coal fields constitute one of the major fields of the world. Pre-war production was 127 million tons, enough to permit an export of from 5 to 10 million tons of Ruhr coal. The reserves are still enormous and may equal the combined total of all other coal fields of continental Europe, outside of the Soviet Union. Valuable lignite deposits west of Cologne and the water power of the many dammed streams, originating in the rainy uplands, add to the concentration of power.

Location and Transportation. Central location amid the densest population of Europe and the chief European market is a great asset. The navigable Rhine River, with its side branches and canals, constitutes the greatest inland waterway system in the world. In peacetime 100,000 river ships yearly passed the Dutch border. The river port, Duisburg-Ruhrort, held first rank among the inland ports of the world. A dense railroad system supplemented the water transportation with trunklines running to all parts of the continent.

Population. Fertile agricultural land even before the industrial development resulted in a rela-

THE RUHR DISTRICT

tively dense population. The district now constitutes one of the largest concentrations of people on the globe. For the area proper, excluding the Aachen and Cologne districts, the population in 1939 was about 7 million. The cities shown on the map have a population of about $5\frac{1}{2}$ million, four of them above the half million mark. Most of these people will look for jobs which only industry can provide.

The Industrial Pattern. The actual industrial pattern shows some interesting features. The coal mine area coincides quite well with the concentration of coke ovens (production 32 million tons) and of iron and steel works. Towns such as Essen, Bochum, Dortmund, Hagen, Oberhausen, and Duisburg-Ruhrort were known for their iron and steel works and heavy manufacturing. The pig iron production (11 million tons) was about equal to that of the entire British Empire and the production of steel (14 million tons) was double that of France. Iron comes partly from the iron ore deposits along the Sieg Valley and partly from imports brought up the Rhine River. A second zone of manufacturing specialized in textiles, with concentrations in Krefeld, Muenchen, and Gladbach

—west of the Rhine—and Wuppertal (the former Elberfeld-Barmen) to the east. Solingen and Remscheid were known for their cutleries. Chemical plants preferred a river location such as Duesseldorf and Cologne. Outside the main area is Aachen, a small unit all by itself, fed by nearby coal mines and with a great variety of manufactures; while the relatively small center along the Roer had paper mills.


Altogether this gigantic development of the Lower Rhine area, now almost completely destroyed, has too good a foundation not to rise again out of its ashes. It is up to the United Nations how far they want to go in controlling that process. The creation of a separate Rhine Republic, which has been suggested, would divorce the Rhenish-Westphalian industries from the rest of Germany. It was tried in 1923 but found no popular support. Now it could be forced, but one wonders if it would be durable.

3. Eupen and Malmédy

● FOLLOWING the First World War the German districts of Eupen and Malmédy were given to Belgium after the population had received a chance to protest the shift if they wanted to do so. Very few used that opportunity. However, the way it was done (each voter was required to sign a register, giving name and domicile) did not represent a real test of public opinion.

Eupen and Malmédy are on the line of contact between Latin and Germanic cultures. While most of it falls within the Germanic zone, the area of Malmédy linguistically belongs to the Walloon section of Belgium and in spite of the German attempt after 1870 to eliminate the use of French, it remained the language of the people.

Although Belgium could therefore claim Malmédy as being culturally part of her sphere of influence, the rest of the area (Eupen and St. Vith)



EUPEN AND MALMÉDY

was and had been German. The reasons for the shift were partly economic (the large forest area to compensate for the forest destruction in Belgium during the war) , and partly strategic (there Germany had built the railroad system which had been used for the invasion of Belgium) . In order to connect Eupen and Malmédy, which are separated by a high swampy plateau, Hauteefange, Belgium also received the railroad line connecting these two towns, although it ran through German territory.

Belgium faced difficulties in her newly added territory. The former German population, after recovering from the shock of defeat, wanted to return to the homeland and was able to express itself in elections. The stronger Germany became, the stronger were the efforts to return the area to Germany. In the election of 1936 more than half of the votes were cast for the German party.

When Belgium was invaded in May 1940 the districts of Eupen and Malmédy were incorporated into Germany. Now they are back in Belgium. The Belgians may well feel that if the boundary is to be restored and made stable for the future, the Germans will need to be expelled and

replaced by Belgians. Otherwise there may again be trouble.


Belgian claims to more German territory have not been made officially. However, if the Netherlands receive part of the Rhineland, Belgium probably will ask for a boundary correction adjacent to the new Dutch territory, which would bring the city of Aachen within the territory of Belgium.

Luxembourg

Luxembourg, twice overrun by German armies, has again been liberated and the 300,000 Luxemburgers are happy to have escaped the fate of becoming German subjects. In August 1942, Luxembourg was declared annexed to the Reich, but the population answered by strikes and mass deportation followed. Too small to exist alone economically—although its share of the Lorraine iron ore deposits makes it more important than its small size would indicate—it had combined with Belgium in a joint customs union. Linguistically German but culturally strongly influenced by the

EUPEN AND MALMÉDY

French, it is a typical remnant of the transition zone between those two countries along with Belgium, Switzerland, and Alsace-Lorraine. Loyal to their country and unwilling to accept foreign rule, Luxemburgers face the future with hope and confidence that small states will find a place in the world of tomorrow.



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
4. Alsace-Lorraine

● THE tricolor floats again from the high tower of the Cathedral of Strasbourg. Alsace-Lorraine for the second time this century has returned to France. Twice (1871-1918 and 1940-1944) the Germans tried to make the territory an integral part of Germany. Twice the French returned, not as conquerors but as liberators. The inhabitants, during the recent war refugees in France or prisoners in Germany, have returned to the homes from which they were expelled.

Nevertheless, France faces a problem. Alsace-Lorraine is a typical example of the already mentioned zone of transition. The language line crosses the Gate of Burgundy, follows the crest of the Vosges and then continues over the Lorraine Plateau, east of Metz, until it reaches the Belgian-Luxembourg frontier. Most of Alsace-Lorraine accordingly falls on the German side. However,

culturally it looks to France. French political influence penetrated gradually in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the French Revolution did its part to consolidate the territory with the rest of France. However, the inhabitants continued to speak a German dialect and were proud of their own customs and traditions. The separation in 1871 was tragic. It was not a return home; it was an abuse of popular sentiment. Germany failed to make Alsace-Lorraine German in the long period of her control. The inhabitants remained true to France, waiting for better days. Those days came in 1918 when Alsace-Lorraine was liberated. But France at that time misunderstood the public sentiment there. They wanted to be French but also wanted cultural freedom within the framework of France. French centralization was not popular in Alsace-Lorraine and difficulties arose especially in the field of religious control and education. A strong autonomous movement resulted, not favoring separation but claiming better understanding of the local problems. Now France has returned after the dark days of Nazi oppression. Perhaps France will this time better understand the point of view of the inhabitants.

There is also the problem of the Saar Basin. After the First World War, the territory of the Saar was put under the temporary control of the League of Nations for fifteen years and France was permitted to use the large coal output as compensation for her destroyed coal mines. In 1935 when that period ended, the Saar inhabitants voted by a large majority to return to Germany. French claims on the Saar territory are again heard. If it is allotted to France the economic advantage to her will be great as the Saar coal and the Lorraine iron ore would no longer be politically separated. There is also the possibility that France will extend her demands to the so-called Palatinate. In fact, many Frenchmen are of the opinion that Germany should have no territory beyond the Rhine River. Those claims, however, have no ethnographic or historical foundation. They are merely strategic or military.



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5. "Corsica, Nice, Savoy"

● IN the period preceding the war, when Benito Mussolini made his fiery speeches from the now famous balcony of the Venezia Palace in Rome, the Fascist crowd sometimes responded with the shout, "Corsica, Nice, Savoy!" There is not the slightest chance that Italy will dare to bring the case to the foreground now but as a post-mortem it is worth while mentioning.

The Italian expansionist view was that Corsica had been occupied by France in 1768 while helping the Republic of Genoa against England and was retained by France after the danger had passed. As for Nice and Savoy, it was pointed out that they had been ceded to France in 1860 as the result of a bargain (between Napoleon III and Cavour) which the French never completely ful-

filled. Historically, these were all regarded as part of the Italian realm.

The essential facts concerning Corsica are as follows. The Republic of Genoa, unable to keep Corsica under control, sold it in 1768 to France with an option (never taken up) to buy it back. After a period of revolt, the island became an integral part of France, although the language spoken is more Italian than French. The French Revolution and the following Napoleonic period (Napoleon was a Corsican) did much to strengthen ties with France. Consequently there was no response from the Corsican population to the demands of the Fascist mobs. Corsica remained loyal to France and was not occupied by the Italians after the downfall of France in 1940; probably Hitler did not think that would be wise.

The case of Savoy and Nice is quite different. The long-existing political unity of Savoy and the Piedmont was that of a dual state, controlling the Alpine passes of the Petit St. Bernard and the Mont Cenis. It was not an Italian state as such but one of the buffer states which are typical of zones of transition between groups of people—in this case between the French and Italians. During

“CORSIKA, NICE, SAVOY”

the Austro-Italian War (1859), the Kingdom of Sardinia purchased French military assistance by promising Napoleon III Nice and Savoy at its successful conclusion. The following year this bargain was kept, although Napoleon III had withdrawn his troops before the expected results of the war had been attained. A French-managed plebiscite in the territories revealed strong sentiment for union with France and (1860) Savoy and Nice were annexed to France. There was some resentment among the Italian people, but the Savoyards had few Italian sympathies and were satisfied with the arrangement. Savoy is solidly French.

From an ethnographic point of view the present political boundary is rather favorable to Italy since the upper part of some of the eastern valleys, tributaries to the Po River, are inhabited by French-speaking people. As in the Tyrolean case, population movements across passes are often easier than upstream along narrow valleys.

The Nice area, once part of the Piedmont, was also in the transition zone and, while partly Italian in character at the time of cession, it has retained few of those characteristics. Here also the change was not against ethnographic principles, and any


plebiscite would show an overwhelming majority for remaining with France.

It is interesting to note that according to the terms of the French-Italian armistice in June 1940, Italy occupied only the territory conquered during her short war period—a few miles of the Riviera coastline (Menton). Again, as in the case of Corsica, she occupied neither Nice nor Savoy.

There are at present indications that France would like boundary corrections in her favor. Such claims may include the shifting of the Riviera boundary eastward and the occupation by France of the upper parts of Val d'Aosta with its French-speaking population.

6. Finland

● FINLAND has always been a favorite country among Americans and its tragic part in the war caused a great deal of concern. An important reason for the tragedy is its location. Finland controls the northern Baltic by means of the Åland Islands and the Gulf of Finland. Its Arctic Corridor as well as its nearness to vital points of the Soviet Union (Leningrad and the Murmansk Railroad) caused fear in Russia that Germany, either by force or by agreement, might use Finnish territory and severely handicap Russia's position in time of war. The Russo-Finnish War (1939-1940) must be considered from that angle. The Soviet Union was clearing her front yard and preparing for war. When Finland refused to accept Soviet demands for military advantages, the latter decided to use force. Sympathy for the Finnish cause was strong not only in the United States but



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

FINLAND

also in Great Britain and France, who planned for a time to send troops to help the Finns defend their country. Refusal by Norway and Sweden to permit the use of their territory for transportation of Allied troops postponed this help until it was too late. Finland had to admit defeat in March of 1940. By the resulting peace treaty she was forced to cede to the Soviet Union her southeastern province (Karelian Isthmus and the west shore of Lake Ladoga including the harbor of Viipuri), the Peninsula of Hango, and the islands in the Gulf of Finland; to accept boundary corrections in the Finnish waist (a junction between the Finnish-Swedish rail line and the Murmansk line was planned); and to surrender the Finnish part of the Rybachy Peninsula on the Arctic coast.

The following year when Germany attacked the Soviet Union Finland decided, under German pressure, to enter the war and gamble on a German victory. She regained her lost territory but did not go beyond her pre-war boundaries. German suggestions of a claim on Russian Karelia, with a population of Finnish origin, found little response in Finland. Nevertheless, German troops in Northern Finland, threatening Murmansk and


the Murmansk line, as well as the use of Petsamo as a base to attack the northern supply route to Russia, caused serious trouble and resulted in severe Allied losses. Great Britain declared war on Finland and the United States broke off diplomatic relations.

The retreat of the German armies in Russia forced Finland to accept defeat in September of 1944. The new peace treaty restored the boundary of March 1940 with two changes. Hango was returned to Finland in exchange for the Porkkala Peninsula near Helsinki and Finland lost the Petsamo province, her outlet to the Arctic and also the location of valuable nickel deposits. Finland also agreed that the Aaland Islands, a point of controversy between her and Sweden after the First World War, would be permanently demilitarized. Finland's new course seems to be one of cooperation with Russia and the outcome of the latest elections strengthened that attitude. Having suffered from the ravages of two wars, the Finns need a long time of recuperation.

7. The Baltic States

● THREE Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) have disappeared from the ranks of sovereign countries, and are now members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The three small, although very distinct, ethnographic groups, the Estonians (related to the Finns), the Latvians, and the Lithuanians, have been influenced most of the time by surrounding stronger powers. Especially Estonia and Latvia suffered under that handicap. In earlier times they were dominated by the Danes, the Teutonic Knights, and the powerful Hanseatic League. Later came the Swedes and finally the Russians after Peter the Great had consolidated his empire. Russia, as a Great Power, looked westward and found the Baltic borderland necessary to free access to the Baltic Sea. Consequently, Latvia and Estonia became Russian provinces, although the



THE BALTIC STATES

German nobility who possessed most of the land kept its important position and the rural population remained more or less in serfdom. Lithuania, never colonized by the Germans, existed as an independent state since 1200; however, her union with Poland (1569) gradually brought her under Polish influence and at the first partition of Poland (1772) she became part of Russia. In the First World War and especially at the time of the Russian revolution, the Baltic States received their chance. While the Germans, who occupied them at that time, wanted to make them vassal states under German princes, the defeat of Germany and the temporary weakness of Russia made it possible, after a period of revolt and unrest, to create three independent republics.

Under democratic institutions, the three republics started well on their new road. Only one of them, Lithuania, had continuous political difficulties. She never recognized the Polish occupation of Vilna and continued to regard that city as her capital, although "temporarily" outside the state, and friendly relations with Poland were never established, although the Poles forced the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1938.

PEACE ATLAS OF EUROPE

There was also the problem of Memelland, which the Allied powers in 1919 had not given to Lithuania because the population was predominantly German in sympathy. They established an administration under French military occupation pending final disposition. In 1923 Lithuania occupied the country following a show of force. The powers acquiesced after securing a promise from Lithuania that Memelland's autonomy would be protected. The pro-German population continued to give trouble.

All three Baltic states favored political and economic cooperation and formed a Baltic Entente (1934) as an instrument of mutual agreement on Baltic problems.


However, the return of German and Russian strength brought fear of trouble and indeed all three did become the battlefield between German and Russian interests. Abandonment of democratic rule and the establishment of virtual dictatorships were regarded as safeguards against Nazism on one side and Communism on the other.

In 1939 came the crisis. Germany reoccupied Memelland in March, and in August-September, when Germany and Russia came to an agreement,

THE BALTIC STATES

the Baltic States were delivered into German hands. In the following months, all three of them were forced to sign pacts of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, giving the Soviets rights of military garrisons and the use of naval and air bases. Meanwhile Germany removed to Germany citizens of German stock. In July of the following year Russia, preparing for the war with Germany, demanded of all three full military occupation and the establishment of favorable governments. Elections held under Communist auspices gave such favorable majorities (up to 99%) that doubt was expressed concerning the freedom of the voting. A few days later the three assemblies passed resolutions applying for admission into the Soviet Union. This was granted.

Suffering was severe during the long period of German control, which followed the swift advances of the German armies in 1941. Now Russia is back and the three Republics are members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.



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8. The Curzon Line

● THE new Polish-Russian boundary as agreed upon by the three Great Powers at the Yalta Conference caused disagreement and even bitter resentment. While many Poles face the issue with strong emotional sentiments and the Russians regard the issue as closed, it seems worth while to describe briefly the case as it seems to the neutral observer.

The so-called "Curzon" Line was suggested by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers in December 1919 as a practical line of demarcation between Soviet Russia and the new Polish state. It ran from a point near Suwalki on the East Prussian boundary to the northern boundary of Eastern Galicia, following for a part the Bug River. On the map which shows the area which had a Polish majority (according to Polish sources), it is clear that the Curzon Line corre-

sponded rather well with the eastern limit of compact Polish population. The chief exception was in the north in the so-called Vilna Corridor, although it must be noted that the map presents there the results of a Polish census of 1919, which is regarded by many as rather favorable to the Polish interpretation. The Curzon Line, however, was not a *fait accompli*; it was stated definitely that any rights Poland might have to the territory to the east had been reserved. The case of Eastern Galicia was discussed separately; it was not involved in the original Curzon Line.

The Curzon Line was used again by the Supreme Council in 1920 (July 10) at the time of the victorious Russian offensive as a base for an armistice between Poland and Russia and was for that purpose extended to the Czechoslovakian boundary (see map).

After Polish victory and the resulting Peace Treaty of Riga (1920), the Polish-Russian boundary was moved east, almost a straight north-south line between the eastern corner of Galicia to the Dvina River, giving Poland a common frontier with Rumania and Latvia.

The German-Russian partition of Poland in

THE CURZON LINE

September 1939 partly followed the Curzon Line but in the south was shifted west of the former extension, now following the San River; while in the north it shifted from the Suwalki junction to a point much farther west.

At the Yalta Conference Russia claimed the Curzon Line (with small deviations in favor of Poland) as basis for the new boundary, a claim which was accepted by the United States and Great Britain. Whether this new boundary follows the San River is not yet certain. The provisional Polish government (Lublin) accepted the boundary, hoping that territorial gains to the west might offset the great loss of former Polish territory. However, from Poles outside of liberated Poland the strongest protest arose. They argued that:

1. Eastern Galicia not only has a considerable Polish minority (above 40 per cent) but the cities are thoroughly Polish in character and culture. Lwow is considered by the Poles as one of their outstanding cities.

2. The Ukrainians, who form most of the non-Polish population of Eastern Galicia, had no desire to become part of Russia. The plebiscite held by Russia in 1939 did not present a true picture.

3. The Vilna Corridor has an essentially Polish population.

4. Poland is losing a large part of its productive capacity (45 per cent of its wheat; 33 per cent of its potatoes; 80 per cent of its tobacco; 28 per cent of its rye; as well as most of its output of oil and half of its forest resources).

5. Historically the lost part has always been a part of Poland as long as it existed as an independent state.

The Russians in reply argue that:

1. The majority of the people east of the new line are Soviet peoples (Ukrainians, Byelorussians), a fact which the impartially devised Curzon Line recognized.

2. Poland acquired this territory in 1920 not because the people willed it so but because of Poland's act of aggression against Russia.


3. Plebiscites held among the people in 1939 showed an overwhelming desire to join the Soviet Union.

4. Poland's claims on historic grounds are fantastic, as such claims often are when they take no accounting of changes over the years or of present realities.

THE CURZON LINE

5. The Soviet Union can show that such economic losses as Poland will suffer from the new boundary will be compensated for by Polish acquisitions at Germany's expense.

Whatever may be the merits of the new boundary and of the methods by which it is being fixed (some revisions may be made), it must now be accepted as established fact. If the solution is not to lead to continuing friction, it may be found desirable to permit the Poles east of the line to migrate to their homeland. Good will is badly needed on both sides of the new boundary. Only then may time gradually erase the feelings of distrust which have disturbed relations between these two peoples for generations.



9. East Prussia, Danzig and the Corridor

● At the Potsdam Conference Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union agreed, pending the final peace settlement, to deprive Germany of East Prussia and the city of Danzig and to run the new Polish-Russian boundary through East Prussia, dividing it into two parts. This will automatically eliminate the Corridor as such, and even the Pomeranian area to the west will be added to Poland.

In order to understand the significance of this change, it is necessary to study the historical background. East Prussia, as the name indicates, was originally inhabited by the Prussians, a Slavic tribe related to the Poles. In the thirteenth century the so-called Teutonic Knights conquered most of this territory but were forced to become vassals of Poland, while parts of East Prussia, including Danzig

and Allenstein, were actually part of Poland (Peace of Than, 1466). At the time there was a Polish Corridor separating East Prussia from German Pomerania. It was not until 1660 that Polish suzerainty over East Prussia ended and then not until the time of Poland's partition (1772-1795) that East Prussia became connected territorially with the rest of Germany. It became thoroughly Germanized, although the southern part (Masurian Lake district) was occupied by Polish people. Germans infiltrated the former Corridor, especially as city inhabitants.

At the end of the First World War, reborn Poland claimed the Corridor as an economic necessity and also because of its still predominantly Slavic population. An effort to regain the southern part of East Prussia was unsuccessful, as a large majority voted to remain with East Prussia (plebiscite of Allenstein and Marienwerder). The problem of Danzig, a German city, but at that time the only Baltic port on the Corridor, was solved by the creation of the Free City of Danzig under the supervision of the League of Nations. The Corridor remained a bone of contention between Germany and Poland and ostensibly was the reason

DANZIG AND THE CORRIDOR

for the war between Poland and Germany. Meanwhile Danzig, in spite of economic prosperity, which was later diminished by the creation of the Polish harbor of Gdynia, went more and more pro-Nazi and presented a real problem to the League. In March 1939, Memelland, separated from East Prussia after the First World War and autonomous under Lithuanian control, was occupied by Hitler. After the conquest of Poland, the Corridor and the Free City of Danzig ceased to exist and the Suwalki district was added to the German territory.

Now the shoe is on the other foot. Defeated Germany faces the loss of the whole of East Prussia, and Danzig will be a Polish city. Two million Germans will have to leave the land (most of them fled before the Russians came). The Junker caste has lost its properties. East Prussia has returned to the Slavs. Russia's desire for Koenigsberg as an ice-free port has been supported "in principle" by the Potsdam Conference and the boundary will probably run south of the Pregel River. The Polish Masurians will return home, whether they like it or not. Perhaps the problems of East Prussia and the Corridor have been solved.

10. The Western Boundary of Poland

● POLAND, having lost territories in the east, looks westward for compensation. How far its westward extension should go has been determined, at least until a final peace settlement.

After the First World War the areas of Poznan (German Posen) and Pomerellen (the Corridor), formerly part of Germany, were included within Poland. Even the Germans had to admit that they formed a minority there. Using German figures for 1910, the German percentage for Pomerellen was 42 per cent and for Poznan 28 per cent. After the shift the number of Germans dropped. In 1926, for instance, the percentages were respectively 12 and 9, and it can be said that preceding the recent war there was practically no German problem as far as the Poles were concerned. This decrease

took place partly under pressure. However, the method was gentlemanly in comparison with what the Germans did after their conquest.

The Polish claims to the west consist of two parts: Silesia up to the Neisse River and all the land east of the Oder (the new boundary crossing the Oder at Stettin and running to a point just west of Swinemuende on the Baltic Sea). The Polish claims, except for a part of Upper Silesia, cover territory almost entirely occupied by Germans. Their number is difficult to give, as the new boundaries do not follow the former provincial divisions, but an estimate puts the number at $7\frac{1}{2}$ million, including such important cities as Breslau (615,000), and Stettin (268,000).



The claims have an ethnographic basis only in Upper Silesia. The solution of the plebiscite of 1921, which allotted part of the industrial triangle to Germany, left about 400,000 Poles in Germany and the southern part actually had a Polish majority. The claim for a correction there has a good foundation. Upper Silesia should go to Poland.

The question of the rest of Silesia and Pomerania, as claimed by the Poles, must be decided at the peace settlement on the basis of what the

BOUNDARY OF POLAND

United Nations decide to do with Germany. Historical claims, as put by the Poles, seem rather far-fetched. Eight centuries is a long time and if used as a criterion in other parts of Europe would lead to weird decisions. However, Poland has suffered severely and has the full sympathy of the world. The rich land of Silesia and Pomerania would more than offset the Polish losses to Russia as far as productive value is concerned. Probably most of the Germans have left anyway and although it may be difficult for the Poles at first to populate the new land, the high Polish birth rate will take care of that. On the debit side of the shift would be the certainty that the Germans will never accept that loss as permanent and the fact that $7\frac{1}{2}$ million refugees would add to the population confusion in the rest of Germany.

Seen from an historical angle, the shift would mean the return of the Slavs after long centuries of retreat eastward and the collapse of the Germanic tide which, since the twelfth century, has flowed eastward.



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

11. Bessarabia and the Bukovina

● IN June 1940 Rumania ceded Bessarabia and the northern part of the Bukovina to Soviet Russia after a 24-hour ultimatum. While this political status undoubtedly will not be changed after the war, it is interesting to study the basis for the Russian claims. Bessarabia, once the home of the Bessi tribe from which it derived its name, was in early times part of the Moldavian political unit and shared its fate during the Middle Ages. In the fifteenth century the Turks conquered both Moldavia and Bessarabia and defended them against attacks from Cossacks and later the Russians. In 1812 Bessarabia came to Russia (the Prut River was at that time the western boundary) and remained with Russia until the end of the First World War, except for a short period following the Crimean War (1856-1878)

when the southern part was given to Rumania, the boundary then coinciding with the ancient Trajan Wall of the Roman Empire.

In 1917-18 Bessarabia, separated from the rest of Russia by the then independent Ukrainian State, declared itself independent but a little later was joined to Rumania. This unification was recognized by the Allied Nations but Russia, gradually regaining its former territory, never regarded the shift as a *fait accompli* and the Dniester River became almost a no-man's land as no trade crossed its course. The Russians established a Moldavian-Soviet Unit on their territory with Balta as the capital. Now Bessarabia has returned to Russia.

Bessarabia's location in front of the Wallachian entrance to Europe and the frequent political changes that have taken place there have resulted in a very complex ethnographic structure. An estimate in 1919 presented the following picture: 64% Moldavians (Rumanians), 15% Russians, 10% Jews, 4% Bulgars, 3% Germans, and 2% Turks. In addition there were Gypsies, Poles, Greeks, Albanians, and Armenians—indeed an amazing medley.

BESSARABIA AND THE BUKOVINA

The historical development of the Bukovina differed chiefly from that of Bessarabia in that the Turks ceded it in 1775 to Austria, and Bukovina from then on until the First World War shared the life of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Physically it is very different from Bessarabia. While the latter is a softly rolling plateau in which the rivers have eroded narrow, steep-sided valleys, Bukovina is a hill country leading up to the Carpathian ranges. It received its name from the beech forests which cover the inter-valley divides. Its location at the junction of Austrian, Polish, Russian, and Rumanian interests is reflected by the complexity of the population and accordingly of religion. There are Rumanians and Ukrainians, about equal in number, but also many Germans and Poles as well as Jews. In 1918 when Austrian power vanished, Rumanian leaders asked for a union with Rumania in spite of the desire of the Ukrainians to be included in a Ukrainian State. The Bukovina became part of Rumania which in that way had a common boundary with the newly created Poland which had occupied Eastern Galicia. The new boundary, established in 1944


PEACE ATLAS OF EUROPE

when the Russian armies advanced, leaves the southern part of the Bukovina to Rumania and reflects quite well the ethnographic structure. The solution seems logical especially since Eastern Galicia is now part of Soviet Russia.

12. Bohemia-Moravia

● THE case of the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia, which had its climax in the Munich agreement of September 29, 1938 and the occupation of Bohemia-Moravia in March of the following year, brought to all of Europe the feeling that war was imminent and unavoidable. Having been one of the fuses which set off the European powder keg, it needs special consideration.

The Bohemian Basin is an almost perfect geographical unit. Mountains border it on three sides; only to the south is there a hilly open divide toward Moravia. On the west and north the mountains form a typical barrier with rough topography, dense forests, and few passes. To the east ranges follow each other in echelon, leaving gaps between them.



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

BOHEMIA-MORAVIA

Approximately eight centuries ago Germanic people penetrated the inner rim of the basin then occupied by Slavic tribes. While extending their occupation they lost contact with the Germanic people across the mountains, and although they and the Czechs remained ethnographically separate groups, economically they joined to make Bohemia one of the jewels of the Austrian crown. Relations between these two peoples became increasingly strained, however, with the growth of a strong nationalist movement among the Czechs, who sought independence for Bohemia-Moravia.

When the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed after the First World War and the Czechoslovakian State was created, the German rim automatically remained with the Czech center. Economically they could not be separated. The German belt concentrated on industrial development based on power and mineral resources, and the Czech area was predominantly agricultural. The treatment of the Germans, now a minority (3 million) by the Czech majority (6 million) was far from bad. In fact nowhere in the newly-born state

were greater efforts made to be fair. However, the Germans, once the masters, were now, under democratic procedures, outvoted by the Czechs. This they disliked, but it is doubtful whether their injured feelings would have caused serious trouble if Germany had not started its campaign for "liberation" of all Germans, including those who had left Germany 800 years before. The Sudeten Germans had to be educated to understand how badly they were treated by the Czechs. A Sudeten German Party was organized in Czechoslovakia by Konrad Henlein and, with German financial aid and advice, systematically undermined the Czech republic. By 1938 it succeeded in uniting all German parties except the Social Democrats. The rest is known—the sell-out at Munich and the separation of the German rim from the Czech center, leaving a geographical monstrosity unable to breathe and live; the total occupation of Czech territory in March 1939 and the terror regime under the Germans until liberation came during the last days of the war. Now the old physical boundaries will be reestablished. But the Czech government has already indicated that it does not want the Germans who caused all the trouble to

continue to live there. Most of them undoubtedly will have to go; some of them will perhaps remain.

TESCHEN. When the Czechs were in distress during the Munich period, the Poles took that opportunity to occupy the Teschen district, incorporating it into their state. That was an unhappy solution to a problem which had separated the Czechs and Poles since the days of their political rebirth. The Teschen area is one of ethnographic junction where Poles, Czechs, and Germans meet. It seems rather futile to quarrel about such a small area except for the fact that it contains valuable coal deposits and the important railroad center of Bohumin. Although a plebiscite was suggested, the case was settled in 1920 by mutual agreement between Poland and Czechoslovakia through the arbitration of the Supreme Council of the Allied Nations. However, the Poles claim that they received a raw deal (about 80,000 Poles were left in Czechoslovakia) and that the Czechs profited from the fact that the Poles at that time were engaged elsewhere. From a neutral point of view the agreement seemed fair as the Czechs needed the coal much more than the Poles

who had the Silesia coal district. Also involved in the agreement were the small areas of Spits and Orava which were no further cause of trouble. During the years which followed the Poles sulked, and then came their unfortunate action in 1938. Now Teschen is again in dispute, but an arrangement between the Polish and Czech governments is anticipated.

GLATZ. The Poles, although claiming all of Silesia, have made an exception for the Glatz salient which should fall to Czechoslovakia. The population is definitely German. However, historically, the County of Glatz was until the sixteenth century part of the Bohemian crown and later on shifted to Silesia which at that time was also under Austria. Prussian conquest of Silesia in 1742 brought Glatz under Germany. Geographically it is a case of whether the western or the eastern range of mountains should be taken as the Czech boundary, as Glatz is located between them. Connections west or east are good and the change would give a better boundary and eliminate a strategic entrance into Bohemia. It all depends on whether the rest of Silesia becomes Polish.

SLOVAKIA. Slovakia played an unfortunate part in the recent war. Following the Munich crisis, Slovak separatists, led by Joseph Tiso, connived with Nazi Germany to undermine the rump Czech republic, and in March 1939 achieved independence under German protection. Officially Slovakia fought on the side of the Axis nations and served as a spring board for the invasion of Poland and German expansion southward. However, Tiso never had the support of the majority of the Slovaks. The mistake was made at Munich, not at Bratislava, the Slovakian capital.


It must be remembered that the Slovaks were not always happy in their union with the Czechs. Culturally inferior to them, after centuries of harsh Hungarian domination, they felt that their share in the government of Czechoslovakia did not reflect their numerical strength. However, relations between the two peoples were becoming better when pressure from Hitler Germany, especially after the occupation of Austria, caused more discontent. United again, Czechs and Slovaks should be able to build upon the foundations of collaboration which had been laid during the inter-war years.

RUTHENIA. Ruthenia will be discussed with the problem of Hungary. A recent agreement between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia provided for its incorporation with the Ukraine.

13. The Hungarian Realm

● THE Hungarians—or as they are generally called, the Magyars—saw their kingdom collapse at the end of the First World War, although the remaining nucleus was a rich country with a homogeneous population, they could not forget. They waited for the “Day” to come—the day of revenge. For that purpose they were willing to use the help of the Germans whom they disliked and feared. After obtaining most of their territorial wishes, they met defeat and beautiful Budapest is now in ruins. It is indeed a sad ending. On the map the five sections of expansion are indicated and an evaluation of each one will be made.

1. THE NORTHERN RIM OF THE HUNGARIAN PLAIN. When Czechoslovakia was created, the boundary line was drawn along the



THE HUNGARIAN REALM

Danube River and along the foothills of the Carpathians. This was done in spite of the fact that about 800,000 Magyars formed the major part of the population along the zone adjacent to Hungary. There were, however, geographical factors favoring the new boundary. Mountains and plains complement each other economically and should not be politically separated. Moreover, lines of communication even for the mountain valleys ran along the foothills, so that a political separation would have caused economic inconvenience. In the days of Munich, the Magyars took the southern zone with the blessings of Berlin and Rome. The 800,000 Magyars came home and with them came 200,000 Slovaks. Now this region returns to Czechoslovakia, whose government stands pledged to transfer to Hungary those Magyars who had given most serious offense.

2. THE CARPATHO-UKRAINE. The Carpatho-Ukraine, also called Ruthenia, formed the tail end of the Czechoslovakian State, joining it to Rumania and separating Hungary from Poland. The inhabitants, as the name indicates, are of Ukrainian stock. They are rather primitive peo-

ple, having long been under the rule of Magyar landlords. They were not particularly happy in Czechoslovakia. A promise of autonomy was not kept and the political situation remained unstable. At the time of Czechoslovakia's dissolution (March 1939), the Carpatho-Ukrainians dreamed for a moment of independence—in fact they were independent for a few hours—but then the Magyars marched in. Bordering the Ukrainians across the Carpathian passes, they expressed willingness to join them and enter the Soviet Union. An agreement (June 1945) between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union has legalized this step. Consequently, Russia will have access to the Hungarian plain, a strategic advantage often sought but never before obtained.

3. NORTHERN TRANSYLVANIA. The Transylvania case, temporarily solved in August 1940, consists in reality of two separate Hungarian claims: the rim of the Danube plain, and Transylvania itself. The rim presents the same factors as that of Slovakia. The main line of communication runs along the foothills of the Transylvanian hills. By virtue of Rumania's acquisition of that

line after the First World War, a number of cities with large Hungarian minorities (in some cases even majorities) were separated from the Magyar homeland. The 1940 boundary cut that line, leaving two of the cities (Timisoara and Arad) in Rumania and the three others (Oradea, Careii Mari and Satu-Mare) in Hungary—a good example of ungeographic thinking.

Transylvania itself offers another problem. The population, concentrated in valleys and basins, separated by wooded hills and mountains, is chiefly Rumanian. However, there were a number of cities with German inhabitants, such as Sibiu (Hermanstadt), Brasov (Kronstadt) and Cluj (Klausenburg). Altogether there were about 250,000 of them while in the southeastern corner there was a large island of Magyars, the so-called Szeklers, almost a million strong. The Magyars, the former rulers, wanted the return of the whole of Transylvania. In 1940 they obtained a large share, a strange-shaped wedge, which brought the Szeklers into Hungary but cut a geographical unit into two politically separated parts. At the same time, the reconquered areas contained more Rumanians than Magyars. In 1945 Transylvania was returned


to Rumania to compensate her for the loss of Bessarabia.

4. THE SOUTHERN DANUBE PLAIN. The southern part of the Danube plain with its three units (Baranja, Bachka, and Banat), separated by the Drava, Danube, and Tisa Rivers, presents a problem of hopeless ethnographic complexity. It was for a long time the frontier zone against Turkey. Refugees settled there, and other groups were invited to increase military strength. Generally speaking, it is a transition zone between Serbs and Magyars—strongly Serbian in the south, strongly Magyar in the north. However, there are many Germans, Croats, Rumanians, Slovaks, Ruthenians and others. The boundary solution after the First World War, giving this territory to Yugoslavia, was rather severe on Hungary. The western part (the Baranja) especially should have been left to her. When Germany invaded Yugoslavia in April 1941, Hungary, which only a few months before had completed a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia, joined the Germans and received as payment both the Baranja and the Bachka. The Banat became a German stronghold.

THE HUNGARIAN REALM

Now the process has been reversed and the Yugoslavs are back.

The new Hungary faces a difficult task. It antagonized all its neighbors by its acts of aggression, and now, having lost, will have to face the consequences. If it can settle down to a peaceful existence, its fertile plane and central location assure it a prosperous and stable future.



14. The South Tyrol

● THE question of whether the South Tyrol will remain with Italy or return to Austria may again baffle the boundary experts.

The essential facts are as follows. Easy passages across the main chain of the Alps from the north (Brenner, 4,000 feet; Reschen, 5,000 feet) and the wide opening towards the Drava Valley eastward (the so-called Corridor of Toblach, 4,000 feet) encouraged an early inflow of Germanic people and made the upper part of the Adige drainage system Germanic land. The narrow, stony valley of the middle Adige separated this area, later called the South Tyrol, from the Trentino which was inhabited by Italians. Both were under Austrian control until 1918. In the eastern mountains the population is neither Germanic nor Italian but Ladin, a remnant of the pre-Roman period. During the First World War Great Britain and

France promised Italy (Treaty of London, 1915) not only the Trentino but also the South Tyrol up to the Alpine passes. The Italians called that their geographical boundary. After the war, President Wilson rather surprisingly accepted the Italian point of view and the transfer took place against the will of the approximately 250,000 German-speaking inhabitants and against the strong protest of Austria.

The efforts of Italy in the inter-war period to Italianize the South Tyrol—they called it the Upper Adige—were only partly successful. Italian officials and Italian names did not hide the existence of violent opposition, strongly backed up by the Austrians beyond the political frontier.


When Austria was overrun by Germany, Hitler inherited the Tyrolean problem. Political friendship between Germany and Fascist Italy required a solution. In 1939 an agreement was reached providing that those who wanted to remain German should leave the country, and would be compensated for the loss of their property, while those who stayed would indicate their willingness to become Italian citizens. This drastic solution caused a wave of opposition, but in vain. Hitler sacrificed

THE SOUTH TYROL

the South Tyroleans on the altar of Axis friendship.

In January 1940 the vote was held. Of a total of 229,500, 166,488 (73 per cent), it is reported, voted to leave the land and be settled in Germany. They had three years to settle their affairs. Where they went is not known. Most of them were probably settled in conquered Slavic territory. The case of the South Tyrol seemed to have been settled.

Now it will be reopened. Undoubtedly many of the former inhabitants, as a result of the fortunes of war, have again been expelled from their new homes and are refugees at large. Should these victims of the whim of Hitler be permitted to return to their former land and, if that is permitted, where will the boundary run? The decision to be taken by the United Nations will be influenced by the answer to the question of whether they prefer Italian control of the Alpine passes or want to enlarge a new-born Austria.



15. The Problem of Istria

● ISTRIA presents a controversy between Italy and Yugoslavia. Will it become a part of Yugoslavia or will those countries come to an agreement acceptable to both?

The facts concerning Istria are rather simple but the solution of the problem involved is not so easy. Istria consists of a limestone plateau. The elevation varies a great deal. In general it drops from 4,000-5,000 feet in the north to about 500 feet in the south. However, most of it is above 2,500 feet. A relatively cold winter and the scarcity of good soils make it a poor country from the agricultural point of view, with potatoes as the major crop and also grains such as wheat and corn. Over the centuries there has been a constant intermingling of Italians and South Slavs, with the former generally in control of business and trade and therefore

dominating the larger towns and cities. The country around these Italian Centers is occupied by peasant peoples, almost entirely Slavic (Slovenes and Croats) living in villages near the small patches of good soil.

Along the coast is a zone where conditions are very different. Narrow at spots but widening at other places and extending inland along the valleys, it is typically Mediterranean in character. Here the absence of frosts favors such crops as grapes and peaches, and the inhabitants are mostly of Italian origin. Small towns fringe the coastline. The sea offsets the limitations of the land (fishing, merchant marine) and the Istrian Italians have always had the reputation of being excellent sailors. Density of population is rather high along the coast but low on the plateau. Between the two is the steep wall of the plateau, separating two different economies.

A special aspect of the problem is the function of Trieste, a large city of about 250,000 (170,000 Italians; 80,000 Slavs), one-fourth of all the people of Istria. Ethnically, Trieste is an Italian city. Economically, it serves as an outlet for the Slavic hinterland, and for a large part of South Central

THE PROBLEM OF ISTRIA

Europe. It is a European port ready to regain its former position if conditions permit.

After the First World War, Italy, basing its claim on the promises contained in the Treaty of London, obtained the whole of Istria, despite American opposition at the Peace Conference (see the Wilson compromise line drawn on the map). In places the new boundary went even farther than the London Treaty promised. This brought about half a million Slovenes and Croats into Italy. During the Fascist regime they complained bitterly of maltreatment.

Now we face again the problem of boundaries. But this time Italy has the disadvantage of having been on the Axis side, while Yugoslavia has been one of the United Nations. The parties involved have about equal strength in numbers: 500,000 Italians and 500,000 Slovenes and Croats. During the inter-war years the influx of Italian officials increased the Italian percentage on the plateau, but the Slavic bloc has kept its strength and conditions are not very different from those at the end of the First World War.

One solution would be to turn the whole area up to the Isonzo River—the old Austrian bound-

ary—over to Yugoslavia as the Yugoslav government has been demanding. This would mean that a large element of Italians would pass over to Yugoslavia unless, of course, they were required to leave the country. Another solution would be to draw a new boundary which would take account of population structure, as far as that is possible.

A simple counting of noses would hardly settle the problem, however, since the Slavic and Italian peoples are almost hopelessly intermixed. If population structure, therefore, is to be made an important element in the settlement, there will need to be a considerable amount of compromising by way of reducing to a minimum the minority peoples on both sides of the frontier. In this case: (1) eastern Istria (everything east of the so-called Wilson line shown on map) might go to Yugoslavia. The population of about 400,000 has a strong Slavic majority. Yugoslavia would thus secure Fiume (24,000 Italians, 15,000 Slavs), which Italian aggression denied her after the First World War; and for protection of access to Fiume would have claim to the islands of Cherso and Lussino, with partly Italian population; (2) western Istria (west of the Wilson line) with about 300,000 Ital-

THE PROBLEM OF ISTRIA

ians and 200,000 Slavs might go to Italy. This would leave Trieste and Gorizia under Italian control.

One general statement can be made. Any solution will fail if Italy and Yugoslavia continue to hate each other, while most solutions will work if the two countries resolve to bury the hatchet.

16. Carinthia

● THE question of whether a part of Carinthia, the so-called Klagenfurt Basin, will be ceded by Austria to Yugoslavia has come up again. The Yugoslavs have already stated that claim.

The geographical background is as follows. The Drava River follows a longitudinal valley in the southern part of the Eastern Alps; narrow at the start where the valley as such joins the Brenner line and again narrow in the east before the river enters the Danubian Plain, it widens in the center and forms the Klagenfurt Basin. Mountains frame the basin. The southern fringe is formed by a continuous range, named the Karawanken, which rather completely separates Carinthia from Yugoslavian Carniola. Two passes, around 4,000—feet, and the Rosenbach tunnel of the Trieste-Vienna railroad line, are the only connections. The mountains to the north, the main Alpine

chain, are higher but offer easier passage northward. The railroad to Vienna, the Semmering line, follows this route. The basin is a unit economically with its outlet chiefly to the north.

The 125,000 people living in this basin unfortunately are not a unit. Here Slovenes and German Austrians have intermingled. Generally speaking, Austrians populated the northern part and the southern towns, and Slovenes the southern rural districts.

After the First World War the Yugoslavs claimed the Klagenfurt Basin, basing that claim on the fact that most of the inhabitants (60 per cent according to the Austrian census) spoke Slovene as their mother tongue. The "Big Four" at that time, chiefly on the demand of the United States, ordered a plebiscite to give the people a chance to express themselves. The plebiscite area consisted of two parts—the southern large part (I on the map) voting first, the second (II on the map) voting only if the first one declared itself in favor of joining Yugoslavia. The result of the vote of Zone I was 6 to 4 in favor of remaining with Austria so the second zone did not vote. Not in-

CARINTHIA

cluded in the vote were sections A and B ceded outright to Yugoslavia.

The reopening of the case presents various points which have to be taken into consideration.


1. A great deal depends on the attitude of the United Nations in regard to the status of Austria. If Austria were treated as a defeated enemy, because of lack of underground resistance against the Nazis, the Yugoslav claims to the whole of the Klagenfurt Basin might be accepted favorably and the pro-Austrian population might even be asked to leave.

2. If the Austrians are regarded as having been conquered by the Nazis and subsequently liberated, the Yugoslav claim can be put on an ethnographic basis and the claim may be limited to those parts which showed a Yugoslavian majority at the last plebiscite. Such a solution would destroy the economic unity of the basin and might result in real hardships for the people involved. If a solution of this sort is decided upon, there are again two major possibilities. The new boundary might be put along the Drava River because the area to the south had a slight (50.8 per cent) majority in

favor of Yugoslavia. The second possibility would be that the boundary follow the actual line between pro-Yugoslav and pro-Austria plebiscite result. The approximate location of this line is shown dotted on the map. It would include a rather wide zone in both the east and west, connected by a narrow zone along the north slope of the Karawanken. It would be ethnographically correct but economically very poor.

17. A Possible Yugoslav Federation

● YUGOSLAVIA (known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes until 1929), during the years from 1918 to 1941, was unable to solve its internal problems successfully. Chief among these was the mutual rivalry and animosity among the three Slavic peoples who, though sharing a common ancestry, had grown apart culturally and politically with the passing centuries. A federation of autonomous states might have minimized the difficulty, but the constitution of the new Yugoslavia set up a centralized system. This was dominated by the largest group, the Serbs. The Croats, boasting a higher cultural level through their long Austro-Hungarian contacts while the Serbs were under Turkish rule, in particular complained bitterly. At the very last moment (August 1939) an effort towards decentralization was made in behalf



A POSSIBLE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION

of Croatia, but it came too late and political discontent helped the German armies in their invasion.

The new Yugoslav state will no doubt be organized as a federation. The map suggests how this might be done. While the four main units—Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia—form the basis, certain subdivisions are suggested which, in the opinion of the author, may be found desirable.

1. SLOVENIA. This unit would extend over Carinthia (see map 16) and part of Istria (see map 16) if those sections are added to Yugoslavia. Its Austrian background ensures cultural unity.

2. CROATIA-SLOVENIA. This is also one of the recognized units of rather pure Croatian population, with boundaries as they were during the long period of Hungarian domination.

3. DALMATIA. In spite of its language relations with Croatia, Dalmatia's historical background strengthens the case for its establishment as a separate unit. A narrow coastal zone bordered by the high mountain wall of the Dinaric Alps, Dalmatia

PEACE ATLAS OF EUROPE

developed along its own lines under the strong influence of Venice. Zara and the Isle of Lagosta, both Italian, should be included with it.

4. BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA. This large province, long dominated by Turkey, came under Austrian control in 1878 and was annexed by Austria thirty years later. Its Slavic population, transitional between Croats and Serbs, includes many Mohammedans who were converted when the Turks moved in. Its historical background is sufficiently different from that of Serbia proper to justify a special place in the federation.

5. MONTENEGRO. This small country of the Black Mountains, once a bulwark of freedom amid the flow of Turkish aggression, and a separate nation up to the First World War, deserves special recognition.

6. VOIVODINA. The region north of the Danube (see map 17) is one of mixed population. It was once the frontier zone against the Turks. Serbs prevail in the southern part but in the north-

A POSSIBLE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION

ern section there are many Magyars, Germans, and Rumanians. If those minorities are allowed to remain, their special needs might best be met through federative autonomy.

7. SERBIA. The old Serbia of the years preceding the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 extended toward Kossovo field, the former Turkish Sandjak of Novi-Pazar, once considered the keystone of the Balkans. The sections along the Bulgarian border (see map p. 69) have a certain percentage of Bulgarian population. However, it is practically impossible to draw a dividing line between the Serbs and Bulgars as the transition is a gradual one.

8. THE ALBANIAN UNIT. This name is not good. It is used only for want of a better one. The majority of the population is of Albanian origin and of the Mohammedan faith. During the centuries of Turkish rule the Albanians moved into this originally Serbian country, replacing the former population which either fled or was eliminated. Autonomy to these Albanians will solve a minority problem within the Yugoslavian state.

PEACE ATLAS OF EUROPE


9. MACEDONIA. See special study and map p. 102.

10. BULGARIA. If it were possible to include Bulgaria in the South Slavic Federation, the political framework would be complete. The differences between Serbs and Bulgars have been to a large degree artificial and during the latter part of the Second World War they fought shoulder to shoulder to liberate Yugoslavia. Political considerations may stand in the way of a junction but from most other points of view, it would be an excellent solution.

18. The Bulgarian Realm

● BULGARIA represents a rather sad story. While many of her aspirations deserve sympathy, she has spoiled her own case by the way she went about trying to make them realities. In the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, she quarrelled with her allies and was forced to give in. In both World Wars she took the side of Germany and accordingly sat on the wrong side of the peace table. Those actions were taken by dictatorial governments, generally against the sentiment of the majority of the people who, nevertheless, had to suffer from the results.

Here is the sequence of events. When the Russian armies in 1877 liberated Bulgaria from centuries-long Turkish control the Bulgars hoped, with Russian assistance, to regain the boundaries of the time of greatest expansion in Byzantine



THE BULGARIAN REALM

days. At the peace of San Stefano (1878) those aspirations seemed to become realities. However, the Congress of Berlin (1878), which followed, ruled otherwise and the new Bulgaria was limited to the area north of the Balkan Mountains and the Sofia Basin, while the Maritza Valley (called Eastern Rumelia) remained nominally under the Turks. In 1885 Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia were united under the Tsar of the Bulgars. Another opportunity for expansion came in 1912 when the Balkan Allies (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro) defeated Turkey. But quarrels arose about the spoils and the Bulgars took the matter into their own hands by attacking former allies. The results were disastrous. Rumania entered the war and took the southern Dobrudja, Turkey used the opportunity to regain lost Adrianople, and defeated Bulgaria saw her territorial gains limited chiefly to an extension to the Aegean between the Mesta and Maritza Rivers.

In the First World War Bulgaria, keen on revenge, joined the Central Powers (including Turkey) and again for a time seemed to obtain what she wanted after the defeat of Serbia and later of Rumania. But the war dragged on, the Bulgarian


army became war weary and in 1918 the Balkan front around Salonika collapsed. This time Bulgaria was severely punished. Boundary corrections in Yugoslavia's favor were made along her western border, the Aegean extension (Thrace) went to Greece, and Rumania regained the southern Dobrudja.

In the intermediate period between the two world wars Bulgaria stood sulkingly aside, unwilling to cooperate with her neighbors. The Balkan Entente did not include Bulgaria and when German pressure entered the Balkans, Bulgaria was easy prey. Again it was thought that the time of revenge had come. Bulgaria joined the Axis but refrained from fighting Russia because this might have caused popular revolt among the peasantry who still regarded Russia as their liberator and motherland. Once more Bulgarian authorities got what they wanted. South Serbia was acquired, Rumania was forced to surrender the southern Dobrudja, and parts of northern Greece were occupied. Then Axis defeats and Russian pressure brought Bulgarian surrender and, eventually, cooperation with the Allies in the Balkans.

It is not yet known what the verdict against Bul-

THE BULGARIAN REALM

garia will be this time, but it seems inevitable that Yugoslavia and Greece will regain their pre-war boundaries. (Greece asks for a boundary change—see map 20). Bulgaria once more will be cut off from the Aegean. Only the southern Dobrudja, by mutual consent between Rumania and Bulgaria, will remain in her possession. It is to be hoped that Bulgaria will settle down to a peaceful existence either as an independent country, probably in the Russian sphere of influence, or as a member of a South Slavic federation. What Bulgaria needs after all these wars is a long period of rest and reconstruction and a strong will to cooperate with her neighbors in making the Balkans a worthwhile place in which to live.



19. The Macedonian Question

● THE name "Macedonian" is generally given to the Slavic peasant population of the basins and valleys of the central Balkans. They spring from many peoples, Albanian, Greek, Rumanian, and Jewish, in a Slavic background. But ethnographically they form a unit and speak a Slavic dialect called Macedonian. The exact extent of the territory they occupy is only vaguely known because of blending with other Slavic groups (Serbs and Bulgars) on their borders.

Macedonia's location, and the mixed backgrounds of its small population, have long made it the object of rival ambitions among Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. The Bulgars, claiming that the Macedonians were for all practical purposes Bulgars, included Macedonia in their claims for a greater Bulgaria (see map 20), the frontier of

which was to be carried all the way to the Lakes of Ohrid and Prespa. The Serbians looked southward toward the Aegean and wanted the control of the Vardar-Morava line, while the Greeks claimed Salonika and its economic hinterland.


After the Second Balkan War and again after the First World War the settlement was in favor of the Serbs and the Greeks. Very little of Macedonia was left in Bulgarian hands.

In the Serbian (later Yugoslavian) part, the Macedonians live principally in the Vardar River and basin system, bordered to the northwest by the Albanian minority group. Unwilling to accept Serbian rule and finding in the Bulgars willing co-operators, Macedonian rebels—so-called Komitadjis—having their headquarters in Bulgaria (the famous I.M.R.O., or International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), continued to make raids and terrorize the countryside. Their influence on Bulgarian policy was a definite factor in preventing Bulgarian cooperation in Balkan matters. Most of the leaders have been killed or executed, and their organization is at least in a temporary state of eclipse. Tension is therefore somewhat relieved. But the Macedonian problem

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION

can only be solved if the new Yugoslav Federation includes its section of Macedonia among its autonomous units.

The case of Greek Macedonia is very different. When southern Macedonia became part of Greece in 1912, only the coastal cities had a chiefly Greek population. The wide coastal plains were swampy and practically unoccupied and the hills and upper valleys were inhabited by Macedonians and Vlachs of Rumanian stock. Since then much has happened. The sudden influx of Greek refugees after the disastrous Greek-Turkish War of 1922, practically solved the Macedonian problem as far as Greece is concerned. Vlachs were transported to Rumania and Macedonian Bulgars to Bulgaria. Plains were drained and made productive. New Greek villages with their brightly painted homes dot the former swamp surfaces. Only on the hills are left remnants of the Slavic population, and even they seemed to have accepted the new regime. There are indications that Yugoslavia wants parts of Greek Macedonia (Florina and even Salonika are mentioned), claiming bad treatment of the Macedonians by the Greeks.



20. Thrace and the Dardanelles

● THE political history of this section has been presented under the "Bulgarian Realm," but two problems need to be given special attention here. One is local; the other is of world significance.

The local problem is the following: Greeks and Bulgars have clashed three times in this century (in the Second Balkan War and in both World Wars), and at several other times boundary quarrels between the two have threatened the peace of the Balkans. Each war meant for the population suffering, atrocities, and deportation. The record of Bulgarian occupation of Greek territory in the last war was far from good. The Greeks want greater security and point to the fact that strategically the present boundary is unfavorable. The upper parts of the valleys, leading southward to the Aegean and eastward to the Maritza, are in


Bulgarian hands and facilitate invasion of Greek territory. Consequently, Greece wants a boundary correction. The sparse population of the Rhodope Mountains is chiefly Slavic with some Turks in the eastern part. However, many of them are Moham-medans, so-called Pomaks, and have suffered at times from persecution from their Christian brothers. The present Greek boundary reflects rather well the ethnographic structure, as compulsory exchanges between Turkey and Greece and voluntary exchanges between Greece and Bulgaria have resulted in a great decline in minorities. Turks were allowed to stay in Greek Thrace but their number is not large.

The second major problem is the status of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the outlet of the Black Sea and a focus of Russian interests. Demilitarized after the First World War, Turkey received permission to refortify them in 1936, a reversal of the decision of the Lausanne Straits Convention of 1923. During the recent war Turkey was accused of having permitted passage of Axis shipping. Partly for this reason, but also because of her perennial search for warm water ports, Russia has now reopened the question of the Straits and is demanding special rights there.

21. Albania

● FOR the third time since 1912 the problem of where to place the boundaries of Albania comes to the foreground. While there is agreement that there should be an Albanian State, because of the existence of an Albanian ethnographic group which would not fit into any other Balkan State, opinions vary widely on just how large Albania should be.

Albania had just been established after the Balkan Wars (1913) when it became involved in the First World War. Reestablished after the war, following a long period of disagreement among the Great Powers and Albania's Balkan neighbors, especially Greece (up to 1923), it was never entirely free from foreign—chiefly Italian—interference. Finally on Good Friday, April 1939, Fascist Italy occupied the small state forcing certain Albanians to offer the crown to the King of Italy. Then Al-



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

bania became involved in the Second World War. Most of the fighting between Fascist Italy and Greece was on Albanian territory and many Albanians helped the Greeks in their struggle. Now again liberated from Italian and German occupation, it wants to be recognized as an independent state.


Albanians perhaps hope that the approximately one million Albanians living in southern Yugoslavia may join the homeland, and they also dream of further extension into Epirus. On the other side, Yugoslavia may ask for a shift of the northern boundary, bringing Scutari into Yugoslavia; and the Greeks undoubtedly will ask for an important change in the south. Southern Albania—the Greeks call it Northern Epirus—has been a bone of contention between Greece and Albania since the latter country came into existence. Mixed population, from the language as well as from the religious point of view, makes it extremely difficult to decide what is the best solution. Sympathy for Greece and its claims for a better strategic boundary may have weight in the eyes of the United Nations and it would not be surprising if Albania were forced to give up the southern part,

including the city of Koritza. However, it may be that war tragedies have brought Albanians and Greeks closer together and a compromise boundary, followed by exchanges of minorities, could bring peace to one of the most unstable parts of Europe. Saseno, the Italian stronghold off the coast of Valona, controlling the east side of the entrance into the Adriatic will undoubtedly be abandoned by Italy.

22. The Dodecanese

● RHODES and the twelve islands of the Dodecanese seem to have reached the end of a long struggle aimed at union with Greece. By the terms of the Italian armistice of September 1944, Italy officially relinquished her hold over these islands. German military occupation continued until unconditional surrender, but the islands are now free and are likely to go to Greece.

The Dodecanese (including Rhodes) are islands on the southwest coast of Asia Minor. The population is for the greater part Greek, and seafaring always was and still is the major economic activity. Long under Turkish rule, they revolted together with their brothers in Greece at the time of the Greek War of Independence, but by the Protocol of London in 1830 they came under Turkish control again. The moment of liberation seemed to have arrived when the Italians occupied these islands in their war with Turkey in 1912 and



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

declared that the occupation would only continue until Turkey had evacuated Libya. However, the Italians stayed. In the Treaty of London in 1915 the Allies promised Italy the Dodecanese as part payment for her entrance into the war. Again, after the war, liberation seemed near at hand. Italy and Greece came to an agreement (1919 and again in 1920) that the Dodecanese would go to Greece with the exception of Rhodes, which would receive wide local autonomy and would be allowed to express its political wishes in a plebiscite if Great Britain would be willing to cede Cyprus to Greece. But after the defeat of Greece in the Greek-Turkish war (1922) the Fascist Government denounced the agreements and the Dodecanese remained under Italian rule. They were formally ceded to Italy by Turkey in 1924. Efforts to Italianize the islands failed. Their Greek sentiments were unshakable.

The small Isle of Castellorizo (Castelrosso) off the south shore of Asia Minor was added to the Dodecanese at the time of the First World War, when Italy had hopes of establishing a sphere of influence (Adalia) in Asia Minor. Its inhabitants are Greek but the location is such that one won-

ders whether it would not be better if it were given to Turkey.

Cyprus


The problem of Cyprus is that of a much larger island (3,572 square miles) than Rhodes with a population of almost 400,000, four-fifths of whom can be considered to be of Greek origin. Its history was one of frequent change until the Turks conquered it from the Venetians in 1571. Turkey remained in control until 1878 when she consented "to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England." The main purpose of this British move was to increase Britain's control of the eastern Mediterranean for the better protection of the Suez Canal. In 1914 the island was officially annexed and in 1925 it became a crown colony.

While British control over Cyprus has generally been advantageous to the inhabitants, the Greek part of the population has looked toward Greece as its homeland and has worked with that goal in mind. In 1931 serious revolts occurred.

THE DODECANESE—CYPRUS

During the recent war Cyprus once again demonstrated the importance of its strategic location. The famous triangle of Alexandria, Haifa, and Famagusta became the keystone of British defense.

The return of the Dodecanese to Greece will undoubtedly reopen the question of whether Great Britain will be willing to drop her hold upon Cyprus.



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

23. Denmark and the Case of Schleswig


● DENMARK has regained her post-war boundary and the case of Schleswig seems closed. It is doubtful whether there has been any serious thought of extending this southward to include all of what had once been the Duchy of Schleswig, although historically the claim could be made.

Until 1864 when the might of Prussian and Austrian armies took Schleswig away from Denmark, the Duchy of Schleswig had been for over 600 years a fief of the Danish crown, while adjacent Holstein had been a fief of the Holy Roman Empire. However, German people had moved into Schleswig and in the southern part replaced the former Danish population. These Germans eventually expressed the desire to be united with Germany and were finally "liberated" from Denmark by Prussia and Austria in the war of 1864, when


the whole of Schleswig, including the totally Danish part in the North, was conquered. For a while these two powers administered the territory jointly. In 1866 Austria ceded to Prussia her rights and Schleswig began its new life under Prussian control. A drastic program of Germanization was introduced. The promise that the northern district would be ceded to Denmark if by a free vote the population expressed that desire, was not kept. Still the Danish part of the population there did not lose courage and continued to send pro-Danish deputies to the "Reichstag." In 1918 after Germany's defeat they asked the Allies for the right of self-determination. A plebiscite in February 1920 resulted in northern Schleswig's reunion with Denmark. Southern Schleswig voted (March 1920) by a substantial majority to remain with Germany. The new Danish-German boundary was drawn to conform with the popular vote. Only a few small areas with a German majority fell into the Danish part in order not to complicate unnecessarily the shape of the boundary. If ethnography is the guiding principle here, this settlement of 1920 will doubtless stand.

24. What of Ireland?

● IN 1914, after long and bitter struggle, a Home Rule Bill for Ireland was finally passed by the British Parliament. On the eve of its application, however, it became clear that the northern Protestant counties so bitterly resented the prospect of domination by the south that civil war threatened. The outbreak of war on the European continent, almost simultaneously, made it seem wise, therefore, to postpone application of Home Rule temporarily. At the end of hostilities, the question was reopened, but this time with the promise to the six northern counties that they would not be forced to go along with the rest of Ireland if they did not want to. Meanwhile, the more intense Irish nationalists, such as Eamon de Valera, had come to desire not separation but integration, not Home Rule but complete independence; and they were prepared to and did fight for



RELIGIONS IN IRELAND



EACH FIGURE REPRESENTS 100,000 PERSONS

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

WHAT OF IRELAND?

these objectives. A fierce struggle developed between the British authorities and these Irish revolutionaries, so that it was not until 1921 that, by mutual agreement, there was established the Irish Free State as one of the dominions of the British Commonwealth.

Only the southern counties (26) comprised the Irish Free State; 6 northern counties (Northern Ireland) were excluded and remained loyal to Britain. The boundary between the two was fixed in 1925. Since 1920 the latter have had a separate parliament and executive, while continuing to return 13 members to the British House of Commons. It had been hoped by many that some way could be found to bring these two parts together, but there are still many differences to divide them. In fact, the recent war has sharpened rather than dulled them. Whereas northern Ireland participated in the war, becoming an important base for American Expeditionary Forces, southern Ireland remained aloof and carefully protected its neutrality. This has not contributed to reconciliation.


The differences between northern and southern Ireland spring from a long background of development. Over the years northern Ireland absorbed

many people from the other British Isles, especially Scotland, whose traditional habits and interests were and still often are at variance with those of the south. In religion, for example, the north is two-thirds Protestant, whereas the south is preponderantly Catholic. Of the northern counties only Tyrone and Fermanagh have a Catholic majority, although the largest number of Catholics live in Belfast where, nevertheless, they are outnumbered 3 to 1. Besides, the only considerable industrial and commercial developments are in the north, whereas the south is preponderantly agricultural.

The Irish nationalists have been insistent that the island must not be politically separated, and these views were strongly pressed in the years immediately preceding the recent war in Europe. Their campaign gained strength from changes in the government of southern Ireland. In 1937, the republican element headed by Mr. Eamon de Valera, after capturing political control of the Free State, declared Ireland independent of Britain, renamed it Eire, and devised a new constitution which is now in operation. Unity of all Ireland became one of the fundamental planks in

this government's platform. At the same time, an unofficial, secret, and since 1936 illegal organization, the Irish Revolutionary Army, advanced the cause by intimidation and violence.

The question of whether the boundary reflects popular sentiment is difficult to answer. Election returns in northern Ireland might be cited to indicate that it does although southerners have made frequent accusations of gerrymandering to achieve favorable returns. In the elections of 1918, for example, the ratio of pro-Irish to pro-British was 15 to 22. (The map shows the extension of the pro-Irish majority, as indicated by these election returns.) Since then the pro-Irish area has apparently shrunk, with only parts of Tyrone, Fermanagh, and Armagh left. In the pre-war general election of Great Britain (1935), only Tyrone and Fermanagh returned so-called nationalist candidates with a small majority. And in the present House of Commons of Northern Ireland, nationalists hold 8 seats out of 52.



25. The Levant

● IN MARCH 1945 six Arab States of the Levant—Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordania, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia—adopted a Charter for the Arab League. A seventh country, Yemen, was expected to sign later, while Palestine, unable to sign officially because of its present political status, will nevertheless be represented in the Council and will have a vote in the decisions.

The signing of the Charter was a milestone in the political development of the modern Arab world. It emphasized the progress which has been made since the First World War. At that time Iraq and Trans-Jordania were made British mandates, while Syria—including the four units of Syria proper, Latakia, Djebel Druz, and Lebanon—was mandated to France. Iraq received its independence in 1927. Syria (including Latakia and Djebel Druz but minus the Sandjak of Alexan-

dretta, which went to Turkey in 1939) and Lebanon became independent in 1941. Trans-Jordan has been virtually independent since 1929, although still under British supervision.

In the Charter the Arab nations agreed to co-ordinate their interests and protect their independence and integrity. The Charter provides for consultation in case of aggression against any member and provides that members accept arbitration of disputes. The League's decision must be final and binding. It forbids the use of force to settle disputes.

The Levant still bristles with problems. The two most important are the French attitude towards Syria and Lebanon and the problem of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine, where Britain retains mandatory authority. The French have recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon but want certain preferences before they relinquish their hold entirely. It was on this point that clashes occurred between the French and Syrians in the spring of 1945, to the deep concern of Great Britain.

The other problem is extremely difficult and

delicate. It is not so much the result of contrast between the Jewish and Mohammedan religions as it is the clash between two different social groups—the Jewish immigrant and the Arab peasant. The Jews brought new ideas, backed by capital and modern science. The often barren land was made productive through irrigation and planned cultivation. Tel Aviv is now one of the world's most modern cities and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem has a staff of scientists up to the standards of the best. On one hand, however, Palestine is regarded as the Jewish homeland, capable of taking care of the thousands who need refuge after their tragic wanderings. On the other hand the Arabs, at present in the majority (Moslems, 987,000; Jews, 478,000) and fearful of being submerged, regard Palestine as rightfully theirs and are unwilling to tolerate further Jewish immigration.

Both sides have strong backing. The Jews have the sympathy of many Westerners, especially since their ordeal in the war; and the Arabs have the united support of the Arab states. A solution forced upon either of the two would doubtless be

impractical. A compromise, such for instance as a dual state, can only be reached if both parties concerned can come to an agreement. So far there has been little progress toward this goal.

Political Factors in Boundary Making

C. GROVES HAINES

● MANY of the boundary problems described in the foregoing text were debated and "settled" at the Parish Peace Conference a quarter century ago. Prevailing opinion then, deeply influenced by the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination, held that paramount consideration in the drawing of all boundaries should be given to the wishes of the people involved. High value was therefore placed on the factors of language, cultural and historical background, race, and national sentiment. If these could be measured and weighed fairly—there were very competent commissions of experts organized by the Conference for this purpose—and then be properly balanced with geographical, economic

and political considerations, it was believed that an equitable settlement could be reached.

For the simple reason that the peoples of Europe, particularly in eastern Europe, have intermingled so much over the centuries, it happened that the principle of nationality was honored as much in the breach as in the observance. Bohemia went in entirety to Czechoslovakia, although there were approximately 3,000,000 Germans living in the region of the Sudetes Mountains who would probably have preferred to stay with Austria at the time; to have honored the wishes of these Germans would have made Czechoslovakia impotent before a menacing Germany in the future and would hardly have been sensible. In the same way compromises had everywhere to be made. Yet, by and large, adherence to the nationality principle was consistent, even for the boundary settlements affecting defeated Germany. The Corridor went to Poland because its population was predominantly Polish, but Danzig was given a special autonomy because it was mainly German; the cession of East Prussian Allenstein and Marienwerder to Poland had been considered and was then abandoned when the people of these

two areas voted overwhelmingly for continued union with East Prussia; the new frontiers in Upper Silesia and in Schleswig were drawn in accordance with the wishes of the people as expressed in plebiscites; and, finally, French hopes for annexation or control of the Saar and the Rhineland were dashed by British and American insistence that this was contrary to the principle of national self-determination and was politically unwise. Altogether, the peace settlements reduced by half the numbers of minority peoples who lived under alien rule in Europe. Those which remained were to be protected in their rights by special minorities treaties which the newly created states were required to honor.

While the principle of national self-determination thus profoundly influenced the determination of political boundaries, there were also other weighty considerations which had to be taken into account. The strictest adherence to ethnic factors, apart from its impracticability, would have violated what were also regarded as equally essential elements in the shaping of a states system which would contribute to the general peace and prosperity. One of these was economic: each state was to

have reasonable access to vital resources and essential communications; and areas which had developed into economic units over the years were not to be ruthlessly carved up merely to satisfy the principle of nationality. Another was the so-called strategic factor: every state, it was maintained, was entitled to defensible frontiers, insofar as these could be established without doing too much violence to national sentiments. A third and very important consideration was political: What boundary settlements would contribute to the weakening of the defeated enemy and discourage his aggressive ambitions in the future? In what way would they help to dam back the Bolshevik "tide" which it was feared might sweep over Europe? How could they be used to build up a combination of power or prevent the building up of a combination of power to ensure the security of the great victors, after the fashion in which each of these was given to interpret its security? In the final analysis, these political issues deeply colored the settlement of boundaries, as they always do.

The power distribution and interplay of interests among the Great Powers immediately after

BOUNDARY MAKING

World War I determined the degree to which ideals of settlement were compromised by practical political considerations. Of particular significance was the vacuum left in eastern Europe by the temporary eclipse of Russia during the period of revolution and civil war. There was therefore no formidable obstacle in that area to the creation of states and the arrangement of boundaries which would fulfill the objectives of the western victors, except, of course, such difficulties as were created by the passionate rivalries among the peoples of the small states themselves. But there were disagreements among the victors on broad general policies which were to be applied. France would have preferred greater generosity to Poland and other potential eastern allies and would have had few scruples about incorporating into metropolitan France in one way or another territories which were predominantly German in population. The British, however, saw no object in committing themselves heavily in eastern Europe and, in any case, were not prepared to accept French domination of the continent any more than they had been willing to accept German domination. The United States, with no direct interests

on the continent, played down the political considerations of settlement and, therefore, more frequently supported the British position than the French. It was this meeting of British and American thought which, although arrived at from difference premises, accounts for such consistent adherence as there was to the nationality principle.

Now at the end of World War II in Europe both the basic assumptions and the political conditions which will determine boundary settlements are profoundly different. There is still general adherence to the belief that the nationality principle is basically sound although there is considerable support for the opinion that boundaries can be arranged quite arbitrarily and that once they are fixed the minority peoples remaining behind can then be transferred out of the country. This has already been given official sanction by the governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland and has been widely discussed in other connections.

Much more important is the extraordinary change in the distribution of power which has been produced by World War II. Germany and Italy have been reduced to a state of impotence without parallel in modern times; France has like-

wise suffered heavy losses in strength and prestige; relatively speaking, Great Britain commands much less influence in world councils than was the case in 1919. The Soviet Union, which at the end of World War I was ignored because of its weakness as well as for the things for which it stood, is now one of the giants among the Powers, the other being the United States. Since the latter has been a non-European power, it could be assumed that to the extent to which boundaries are to be settled in terms of the political interests of the great states, the Soviet Union will have the strongest voice in settling them. The indications are that this will at least be the case in eastern Europe. At all events, the new power relationships will largely determine the degree to which the principle of nationality will be adhered to in the drafting of new boundaries.

Whatever the consequences of the interplay of these forces in determining what the new map of Europe will be, it should be borne in mind that political boundaries are never inherently good or inherently bad. They always represent compromises based upon the momentary balancing of ideals and what are believed to be practical con-

siderations of statesmanship at the moment. If the trend away from political nationalism in its more recent and rabid forms is hastened by the new United Nations organization, as well it might be, the injured sentiments which may follow from these compromises should raise no insoluble problems for the future.

Clashing Power Interests

MARTIN EBON

● IN YEARS to come Europe's boundary problems will symbolize Big Power rivalry. As a result, those problems geographically located within the sphere of a single major power will represent no great potential danger. Those territorial questions, however, which lie on the periphery of rival power zones will be the danger spots of the world.

When Romania and Hungary, under the guidance of the Soviet Union, came to a solution of the Transylvania question, they disregarded historical claims and counter-claims for the sake of peace within the zone of interest of a great power. There are other such examples. Czechoslovakia's cession of the Sub-Carpatho Ukraine to the Soviet Union, in the summer of 1945, falls into this pattern. While in the West there are no territorial

conflicts among the Allied powers, adjustment of frontier changes made by the Germans are easier because they do not involve the immediate interests of any one of the Big Two of Europe, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

The real dangers to the future peace on the European continent are to be found in those regions where British and Soviet desires for security involve the same or adjoining territories. This is particularly true in the Balkans. Although it has never been officially announced, there is little doubt that Great Britain was assigned Greece, at the Teheran Conference, as its Balkan zone of interest and control, while Russia occupied or influenced the other Balkan nations: Thus, all pressure, all territorial demands, all allegations of persecution voiced in the Balkans immediately after Germany's defeat, affected the northern frontiers of Greece and the eastern boundaries of British- and American-occupied Italy.

The other four regions which must be regarded as powder kegs of post-war Europe, are: (1) Trieste, where Yugoslav and Italian demands conflict; (2) Southern Albania, which is being claimed by British-controlled Greece; (3) Greek Mace-

donia, which the government of Yugoslav Macedonia desires to include in its territory; (4) Western Thrace, which Bulgaria wants as an outlet to the Mediterranean. The historical basis for these claims has been outlined in an earlier part of this book. What gives them current importance is the fact that they cannot be viewed merely on their own merits or demerits but as parts of a much larger political framework.

After the discovery of the atom bomb, observers of the international scene emphasized the futility of power politics along the time-honored line of territorial claims and counter-claims. Nevertheless, there is no evidence whatever that recent sensational discoveries in the field of war-making power have lessened the strength with which demands and accusations on the peripheries of power have been voiced. There is no other explanation but that there exists a law of political inertia, a pattern of international behavior which has not adjusted itself to revolutionary changes in the fields of science and technology.

Detailed analysis shows that the pattern of big-power political behavior is essentially the same as that of individual behavior. Discussions about the

use of atomic power have been paralleled by efforts on the part of most people to seek refuge from the momentous and monstrous ideas of atomic potentiality. Just as the individual seeks escape in his daily work, in the little conflicts to which he is adjusted, so statesmen have in many cases sought to escape in a world they know, the good old world of established power politics, with its tools of boundary-minorities disputes, charges and counter-charges, speeches, denunciations, memoranda, inspired editorials, and propaganda broadcasts.

Thus, barrage after barrage of psychological warfare has crossed the frontiers of Yugoslavia and Italy, Albania and Greece, Yugoslavia and Greece, Bulgaria and Greece. The language in which claims and accusations were phrased has often been violent. In addition, reports of clashes along the frontiers and of alleged brutalities against minorities have rained down on the world public with monotonous continuity. These reports usually came from areas to which reporters of responsible news agencies and papers did not have access. To a world which remembered the origins of World War II such reports were disturbing because on the surface they were little different

from the technique used by Nazi Germany to advance its claims against such countries as Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Nazi Germany alleged mistreatment of German minorities in foreign countries and used its propaganda machine to tell the world about its alleged grievances. No matter what the merits of each individual case, some of the commentaries appearing in government-influenced publications or broadcast over government-owned radio stations in Belgrade, Athens, Tirana, and Sofia were curiously reminiscent of the verbiage by which the late Dr. Joseph Goebbels implemented the policies of the Nazi state.

Just as the law of inertia will send a car from which the brakes have been removed crashing down into destruction, so the political inertia of power aspirations is dangerous. That is the immediate lesson to be drawn from the facts outlined on previous pages. These facts are applicable to the history of today and tomorrow. They show that boundary disputes and minority questions are not of themselves a danger to the peace, but that they may serve as tools in the application of power concepts. It is therefore accurate to say

that territorial conflicts are not of themselves evil or insoluble or sources of small and great wars, but that they may be used directly or indirectly to kindle the flame of conflict.

Gaetano Salvemini, the distinguished Italian scholar who is now a citizen of the United States, has said that only when the small nations of Europe refrain from squabbling over "a few fig trees," thereby serving the ambitions of the larger powers, can they be sure that their own legitimate aspirations will find a willing ear among the freedom-loving peoples of the world. It is certainly true of the people of the United States that territorial disputes impress them as petty fights. Often the true historical issues are overshadowed by emotional arguments which do not sound very convincing to anyone weighing them dispassionately.

There is much to be said against the intense opposition of one ethnological or linguistic group among the Balkan peoples against another. Americans are doubly suspicious of elements which attempt to transplant old-world nationalisms to the soil of the United States. Of course, the majority of foreign-born Americans or second-generation Americans live removed from the more violent ar-

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guments over territorial and population questions. Nevertheless, some of the disputes have been so noisy that their echoes could be heard around the world.

The conflict between Serbs and Croats, Albanians and Greeks, Yugoslavs and Bulgarians, Romanians and Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks, Slovaks and Hungarians, Romanians and Yugoslavs, Bulgarians and Greeks, Bulgarians and Turks, have bewildered and often annoyed people who could not understand the low emotional boiling point of the nationalities, races, and religious groups involved in these disputes.

No one can deny that issues and grievances exist. But no one can deny, either, that they are sharpened and heightened where big powers make their influence felt. After World War II, the influence of Germany had been removed, and the influence of France almost completely eliminated, from the Balkan scene. On the other hand, Russia's influence has grown considerably, Great Britain has retained some of her political foothold, and the United States now considers the Balkans an area in which America's revitalized interest in world affairs must be taken into consideration.

The failure of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1945 symbolized the high degree of rivalry that has developed between the great powers. The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and China were represented at this meeting. There, in accordance with the decision at the Potsdam Conference by President Harry S. Truman, Premier Joseph Stalin, and Prime Minister Clement Attlee, the ground work for a final peace conference of the United Nations was to be prepared. No useful purpose is served in trying to hide the utter collapse of the London negotiations which ended with statements issued by the foreign ministers, accusing one another of lack of cooperative spirit. The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1945, did not substantially alter the impression left by this disagreement.

Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff, Soviet Foreign Commissar, said in a press conference on October 3, that the failure at London had been due to intransigence on the part of the other participating powers. He insisted that they had suggested procedures and steps which would have meant a change in the agreement entered into at Potsdam.

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Mr. Molotoff also demanded that France and China be excluded from the discussion of vital questions. He told the press: "You will act rightly if you stand by decisions and not by notes, no matter from whom you may receive them. You will be right if you recall the fact that the decision of the Berlin Conference by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee and Premier Stalin established accurately what states and by which procedure treaty discussions and drafts should be arranged. The council adopted no decision canceling this."

An editorial written a few days later in the Moscow *Izvestia*, which can be considered an official document because of this paper's standing as organ of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R., said: "The first session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs ended without result. No decision whatsoever was adopted. Not even a communiqué which could have explained why the ministers' council failed was issued."

What was the real reason for the breakdown of the London meeting? Mr. Molotoff has answered that it lay in the different conceptions of the Berlin agreement.

"The seriousness of what happened in London cannot be underestimated," *Izvestia* said. "If the American and British Governments will in the future insist upon their position, which in no way can be brought into accord with loyalty to the already concluded tripartite agreements, then this will shake the very basis of collaboration among the three powers."

A different view of the London proceedings was expressed shortly after the closing of the conference by the ranking representatives of the United States and Great Britain. United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin both stated publicly that the intransigent and unpredicted attitude of the Soviet Union in this discussion had, in a large measure, been responsible for the failure of the London talks.

Secretary Byrnes said in a radio address on October 5 that aside from procedural difficulties, the Soviet delegation had been disappointed "with the failure of Great Britain and the United States to recognize the Bulgarian and Romanian governments."

Speaking of the Soviet Union's view of this issue,

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the Secretary stated: "The thought apparently exists in their minds that our government objects to these governments because they are friendly to the Soviet Union and that our unwillingness to recognize these governments is a manifestation of unfriendliness to the Soviet Union. There could be no greater misconception of our attitude. I was at Yalta.

"The Yalta declaration on the liberated and ex-satellite countries was based on a proposal submitted by President Roosevelt. Under it the Allied powers, including the Soviet Union, assumed the responsibility of concerting their policies to assist in the establishment of interim governments broadly representative of all important democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people. That pledge cannot be fulfilled in countries where freedom of speech and of assembly are denied. That policy I have recited, sponsored by President Roosevelt, was America's policy and remains America's policy."

Regardless of the reasons behind the failure of the London Conference the fact remains that no

agreement on major issues resulted from it. Certainly many boundary and minority questions relating to zones on the periphery of power interests were discussed but not solved. This includes, for instance, what Foreign Secretary Bevin called "the difficult question of the Italian-Yugoslav frontier." A deadlock was reached in the discussion of Soviet and United States proposals and of peace treaties for Romania and Bulgaria. The issue of the Dodecanese Islands and their cession by Italy to Greece was not solved. Early in November, 1945, reports stated that the Soviet Union itself desired bases on the Dodecanese. It is significant that matters of even more vital importance were not discussed at London. Yugoslavia's claims against Austria, Austria's claims against Italy, and the Polish-Czechoslovak dispute over Teschen were not considered. If they had been taken up, their treatment would have shown the problems to be faced at the final drafting of the United Nations Peace Agreement. Similarly, the Moscow Conference merely created a legal formula for recognition of the Bulgarian and Romanian Governments. The Conference had been preceded by

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recognition of the Federative Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia by the United States, although the Department of State had pointed out in its instruction to Richard C. Patterson, Jr., U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade that "it cannot be said that . . . the election conducted on November 11 provided opportunity for a free choice of the people's representatives."

The results of the Moscow Conference, held from December 16 to December 26, 1945, did not decisively affect areas of conflicting power spheres. In fact, no agreement was reached on the then burning issue of Iran, which bears close resemblance to similar European problems. While the general tenor of official comment, particularly of Secretary Byrnes' speech upon his return from Moscow to Washington, was optimistic, it still appeared in early 1946, that a peace conference with final power to settle territorial demands and boundary disputes would reveal deep-rooted conflict. Although there was a great desire on the part of forward-looking Allied statesmen to overcome delays in the final solution of these vital problems, closer understanding between the Soviet Union

on the one hand and the United States and Britain, on the other, would have to precede detailed discussion.

All pending problems would have to be studied intensively before a final peace conference. The United States Department of State has been accused of having failed to prepare the delegation to the London Conference as fully as seemed desirable. Former United States Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles has supported this view and pointed to it as one of the reasons for the lack of results. Secretary of State Byrnes went to London only a very short time after taking office. His department has been in a perpetual stage of reorganization ever since the resignation of former Secretary Cordell Hull. Neither Byrnes nor his predecessor, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., were able to devote sufficient time to the creation of administrative machinery geared to the speed of current international events.

There is evidence also that officers of the Soviet Foreign Commissariat suffer from lack of first-hand knowledge of the people of the Western countries. Travel restrictions, linguistic barriers, and isolation from ideological trends of the West cannot

have been without effect. Thus, the mood of the peace-loving men and women who make up the millions of average people in the Western countries has largely escaped official cognizance among Soviet officials. There is no substitute in diplomatic cables and pouches for first-hand knowledge. The stream of coded and uncoded messages that links the Moscow Foreign Commissariat with its embassies and legations abroad cannot very well suffice in giving a rounded and understood picture of the currents and counter-currents affecting the thinking and actions of the millions who make policy through the media of public opinion and the ballot box.

The problem of isolation on the part of individual diplomats and their staffs is not limited to any one of the great powers. True, Soviet discipline does not facilitate a private social life of its foreign representatives, but American, British and other Allied diplomats are also often forced by circumstances to move within tightly restricted circles. They often know of events and trends only second or third hand at best. There is a tendency, understandable in terms of human considerations, to concentrate on conflicts and revelations, on in-

side information and diplomatic gossip which will make interesting reading in the regional departments of foreign offices.

In this respect there is a close relationship between the dangers and the responsibility of diplomacy and journalism. Both face the temptation of catering to the interests and desires of recipients and readers. As a result, conflict is often overemphasized and unifying trends are neglected. Of course, diplomats—or journalists—are just as much subject to the workings of human nature as anyone else, but, being able to influence men in key positions or mass audiences, both these professions require the highest possible degree of responsibility.

The man in the street also needs to know more about the workings of diplomatic machinery. In it there are answers to some of the most basic questions being asked: Will the atom bomb mean world suicide? Must we fight Russia? Do we want world trade or tariff barriers? Will there always be wars? All these questions and hundreds like them can only be peacefully answered through better understanding among nations, and the ma-

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chinery to bring about this understanding is the machinery of diplomacy. Travel and the free exchange of information through news channels are also vitally important. But diplomacy, its inertia or imagination, its prejudices or tolerance, its mediocrity or competence, may be decisive.

We have seen in the case of current Balkan disputes how differences rooted deeply in history have again become the tools of power politics. But power politics in this sense was already outdated when the airplane, twentieth-century industrial efficiency, and instantaneous wireless communications entered our lives. Self-education on the part of the world public as well as on the part of world leaders can bridge the contrast between technological advances and a diplomatic school of thinking that is only barely removed from the psychology of tribal jealousy and intolerance.

The Foreign Ministers Conferences symbolized the long road yet to be covered. The United Nations Conference at San Francisco, the preceding talks at Bretton Woods, and similar international meetings devoted to cooperation pointed in the opposite direction. They gave rise to hope for

better understanding, but these hopes were dashed at London and not substantially renewed at Moscow.

That does not mean that all boundary problems listed on previous pages of this volume are in fact dangers to the peace of Europe and the world. Netherlands aspirations to German territory to replace inundated Dutch agricultural regions have never been advanced with full official backing. The Netherlands have done an impressive job of post-war reconstruction and may therefore not be forced to push their claims; but even if such claims should emerge and require settlement this would doubtless be done on the basis of full agreement and United Nations consultations.

The future of the Ruhr is of much greater potential importance. It remains a key ambition of the French Republic to find a status for the Ruhr which would remove it from the control of German industrialists and tie it more closely to France. This is definitely one of the problems that will come up when the final peace documents are drafted, but this too is a claim that need represent no danger to the peace; rather is it a challenge to the moderation and imagination of diplomats.

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The question of Eupen and Malmédy as well as that of Alsace and Lorraine may solve itself almost automatically. There is little disagreement among the United Nations with the views advanced by Belgium and France on these matters. French interests in the Val d'Aosta region in Italy's north-western part are more likely to result in disputes within the United Nations should French demands be pushed too strongly.

Territorial adjustments within the framework of the Soviet-Finnish armistice terms have been moderate. And there is no strong feeling about them at this moment even in Finland itself.

Inclusion of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will doubtless remain a latent source of discord. But the proximity of the three Baltic countries to the main body of the Soviet Union removes this question from immediate military considerations, although only final United Nations agreement can solve their status within the framework of international legality. The Polish-Russian frontier was fixed in a detailed agreement by the U.S.S.R. and the Allied-recognized Provisional Polish Government of National Unity, shortly after the Potsdam Con-

ference in 1945. While Polish nationalists will continue to dispute this settlement on ethnological and historical grounds, there is little likelihood that it will be revised again in the near future. The same holds true for other Polish boundaries and the German territories east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers. There too the Potsdam agreement, while provisional in nature, has set a precedent which cannot be overlooked at peace conferences.

Bessarabia and Bukovina are unlikely to be discussed at length in a final peace settlement, for reasons outlined by Dr. Van Valkenburg.

Of the territorial problems faced by Czechoslovakia, only the issue of Teschen has dangerous implications. If this area were on the periphery of rival power zones it would doubtless represent a threat to the peace. As it is within an area where the influence of the Soviet Union tends to pacify conflicting aspirations, this danger is remote or non-existent. However, a final settlement must be arrived at to provide the inhabitants of this region with a feeling of lasting security.

Regarding Hungary, Russian influence is likely to encourage peaceful settlement of age-old disputes. Austria's hope to regain the South

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Tyrol, however, may only find solution after the status of Austria itself has been more clearly defined. Four-power occupation of Austria represents no answer. Sooner or later Austria will move in one of three directions: she will either fall into the Eastern or Western sphere of influence, or become a sort of buffer territory where the interests of the Russian and Western powers overlap. Should she move closer to the Soviet Union and acquire a status similar to that of Czechoslovakia, we may expect stronger assertion of a claim for South Tyrol, which is now part of Italy—a country likely to remain strongly linked to Great Britain and in lesser degree to the United States.

It is when we move toward the Balkans that local clashes may lead to more serious complications. The problem of Istria must be solved at all costs, or it will continue to poison not only relations between Italy and Yugoslavia but between the major powers as well. The fate of Carinthia also depends on Austria's future status. It defies analysis and prognosis until that time.

Immediately after the end of the European war, Bulgaria's demands for a Mediterranean outlet and the Macedonian question as well as the

future of Southern Albania became of utmost importance. Here too, a solution through international arbitration is urgently required.

United States policy regarding European areas of conflict has been defined by successive Secretaries and Under Secretaries of State. Basically the United States Government favors a procedure of solving territorial and minority problems through international consultation rather than through unilateral or bilateral action. When such cases as the questions of Trieste and Carinthia entered the international spotlight, the Department of State has emphasized that the settlement of such problems must wait until the final peace conference. Nevertheless, the Potsdam Conference and other meetings of the Big Powers have at least tacitly or provisionally approved certain changes.

At Potsdam, the heads of state of the Big Three agreed to alter provisionally the German-Polish frontiers, placing Germany east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers under Polish control. In many respects, this action merely furnished a legal framework for a *fait accompli*. When the Red Army liberated Poland and swept into Germany it quickly transferred civil administration of the area in question

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to Polish officials. This occurred before the Polish government was formed provisionally and gained Allied recognition. Thus the civil administration was carried out by representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, then at Lublin and later at Warsaw. Although the Potsdam agreement naturally did not refer to this, it was made clear by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill during a speech in Parliament that Soviet insistence on this large-scale transfer of territory had been a deciding factor.

Where outside influence has been less decisive and militant, United States policy has to a high degree adhered to the principle of delaying territorial adjustments, rather than favoring step-by-step solutions. It is therefore reasonable to expect that when such peace conferences take place, within the framework of the United Nations Organization, they will be faced with a series of most complex international issues. In this respect, the London Conference of Foreign Ministers furnished many indications of areas of disagreement which were ignored at Moscow. When the Potsdam Conference turned discussion of territorial questions over to the Foreign Ministers of the

Big Five, this was done outside of the machinery established at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco.

While there was no direct legal link between the UNO and the Foreign Ministers Conferences, world public opinion took it for granted that the two could not be separated. From an overall point of view this was an accurate deduction. The machinery of the United Nations organization gives the large powers a very important if not decisive role. Any difficulties encountered by the Foreign Ministers would necessarily also be faced by a key conference under the auspices of UNO. Pessimists are inclined to believe that no peace conference can succeed until the large powers have found much wider areas of agreement than they did at London where only secondary matters such as the Finnish armistice found the big powers in agreement.

The crucial question of big-power adjustment to one another's aspirations and beliefs is that of zones of interest. Above all, the application of such basic principles as those contained within the Atlantic Charter in Europe is at stake. Just how

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far these principles may be used as a framework for the advancement of power interests cannot be stated with any degree of accuracy. Particularly in Southeastern European countries has there been a clash of opinion between Eastern and Western views. Free and unfettered elections have been emphasized by the United States and Great Britain as an essential need for the formations of truly representative governments in this area.

There has been disagreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union on the degree of democratic procedure in evidence during the elections held in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania. In Hungary and Austria, however, all three powers were satisfied with the knowledge that the elections took place by a secret ballot and without intimidation of opposition parties. It was to study the democratic conditions and processes in the countries of Southeastern Europe that the United States Department of State sent Mark Ethridge, editor of the *Louisville Courier-Journal* on a fact-finding mission to the Balkans in the fall of 1945. United States and British statesmen have expressed the hope that the precedent set in Hungary might

form a basis for more democratic procedures throughout Southeastern Europe as well as in Poland.

It was, one may assume, as an encouragement to democratic elements in Albania that the governments of the United States and Great Britain sent notes to Albania prior to the elections of December 2, 1945, urging that they be held in an atmosphere of freedom. The two powers forecast recognition of the then existing Albanian regime, provided democratic processes were followed.

The case of Albania served to illustrate that some of the countries of Southeastern Europe are regions where substantial democratic traditions have had little chance to develop fully. It has been pointed out by sympathizers of the Romanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav administrations that they represented a vast improvement over previous governments dominated in an undemocratic fashion by reactionary elements within those countries. Even observers who did not necessarily sympathize with the Leftist regimes that developed in Southeastern Europe after World War II have agreed that an unhealthy economy, poverty, extremely limited education facilities, and other fac-

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tors retarded the progress in the areas in question.

On the other hand, a large segment of public opinion throughout the world, whose spokesmen have been the United States and Great Britain, has accused the Titò government of Yugoslavia and the Groza government of Romania of merely substituting one form of undemocratic rule for another, from which it differed only in coloring and basic approach.

These genuine disagreements and differing points of views are not the only factors which have led to heated disputes regarding democratic development in Southeastern Europe. As in the case of territorial claims, the discussion about the legitimate character of governments in certain Southeastern countries cannot be viewed without attention to the direct strategic and political interests of the Big Three. Balkan history has always been strongly influenced by the active interest taken by Russia and Great Britain. Before the war French interest in this area was considerable.

The shifting strength and rival economic interests of the large powers have been considered responsible for the rather frequent changes in Balkan cabinets. In Romania, for instance, the oil

resources of that nation have been an economic target of oil companies who at times succeeded in influencing political realignments. This is only one example of the foreign trade interests which have made themselves felt in Southeastern Europe and which cannot be disregarded in any discussion of the more lofty aspects of democratization in the Balkans.

As the Red Army entered some of the countries in this region, it effected the removal of certain manufacturing and oil-producing facilities. The fact that some of the companies to which these installations had belonged were at least partly owned by American and British capital must be taken into consideration. Fact-finding commissions representing United States oil interests succeeded in entering Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania in the late summer and early fall of 1945. While it should not be assumed that the United States government automatically reacts to difficulties encountered by American business interests abroad, it is the established task of American foreign representatives to observe closely and protect legitimate foreign interests of American traders.

The British government, too, made quite clear

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that economic considerations were important in viewing political and industrial reconstruction in Southeastern Europe. Bilateral trade agreements and other economic arrangements between the Soviet Union and countries of Southeastern Europe greatly disturbed Western interests. When the Soviet Union in the summer of 1945 expressed the view that oil facilities in Eastern Austria were to be regarded as German and therefore legitimate booty or reparations, this drew immediate protests from London and Washington. Bilateral arrangements on a very large scale were also made between the Soviet Union and Hungary, securing for the Soviet Union an extremely high degree of control of Hungarian production and exports. Similar problems have arisen in nearly all other Southeastern European countries.

While this book is limited to a discussion of European problems, it is well to keep in mind that a very striking parallel to conditions and aspirations in the Southeastern part of that continent is to be found in the Near East. There, too, oil is a leading economic factor. Iran, which was occupied jointly by British and Russian forces in 1941, must be considered no less a region on the peripheries

of conflict in power zones than Macedonia, Western Thrace, Southern Albania, or for that matter, the Dardanelles. Just as political disputes on the continent of Europe must be viewed against the background of political and economic power interests, so unrest in the Levant states and Palestine are basically very similar to disputes regarding Trieste and other danger spots of this nature.

To round out the picture of power interests as they affect a number of world regions, Asia cannot be ignored. The undeclared civil war between the Chungking government and the Communist troops was in many ways affected by the same factors that have a bearing on Southern Europe and the Near East. Korea, where former division of the country into distinctly different occupation zones, bore a strong similarity to the situation in Austria, is part of the same international picture.

The boundary problems of Europe as well as a great number of other international disputes have derived their current importance much less from any historical basis than from present-day strategic-political-economic alignments of the major powers. While on the surface, minority and frontier questions look like a crazy pattern on patchwork con-

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tinents, the picture that emerges after close study is much more simple, and much more illuminating.

There are men of good will in the councils of all powers, large and small. They and all those who make policy and execute it are very human in their approach to the problems with which they have to deal. They are animated in their activities by the same desires, ambitions, and aspirations that shape the lives of all of us. The desire for security for themselves, their families, their groups, and their nations is uppermost in their minds. As in all other human beings there is in them the fear of being outwitted, overpowered, and perhaps crushed by elements outside their own large or small circle. Rarely do they have an opportunity to look far across the man-made frontiers that separate them from each other.

The task of a new statesmanship, and of well-informed public opinion, must be to extend this view, to apply the lessons of technological advance to the realities of international life. The United Nations Organization, with all its faults and limitations, represents another step in the right direction. True, international machineries have long

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been overtaken by the speedy movement of tanks and planes. But the positive elements which often cause the most inexplicable international actions of governments and their representatives should not be ignored. The mechanisms of international affairs are essentially the same as those governing human affairs.

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PEACE ATLAS OF EUROPE

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